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ARTICLES
COPS AND CARS:
HOW THE AUTOMOBILE DROVE
FOURTH AMENDMENT LAW
TRACEY MACLIN

ABSTRACT
This Article discusses Professor Sarah A. Seo’s new book, Policing the Open
Road: How Cars Transformed American Freedom. I focus on Professor Seo’s
analyses of Carroll v. United States and Brinegar v. United States. Carroll is
important because it was the Court’s first car case. Moreover, understanding
Carroll (and Brinegar, which solidified and expanded Carroll’s holding) is
essential because—nearly one hundred years later—its logic continues to direct
how the modern Court resolves Fourth Amendment claims of motorists. Put
simply, a majority of today’s Justices view motorists’ Fourth Amendment rights
essentially the same way that a majority of the Justices did in 1925. Specifically,
Part I highlights Seo’s major assertions regarding Carroll; Carroll’s influence
on another controversial search and seizure decision, Terry v. Ohio, which
upheld an officer’s power to stop and frisk a person he suspects is armed and
dangerous; and finally, Carroll’s connection to the police authority upheld by
the Justices that permits the discretionary and discriminatory policing that
currently pervades America’s highways and roads.
Part II of this Article focuses on the modern Court’s understanding of
motorists’ privacy. Carroll’s vision of how the Fourth Amendment applies to
searching cars was not inescapable. While many lawyers and law students today
might not believe it, not so long ago several members of the Burger Court took
the view that cars should be treated like other effects under the Fourth
Amendment—which meant the warrant requirement would apply to cars.
Though a majority of Justices never embraced the view that warrants are
required to search the interior of vehicles, in a series of cases the Court went
back and forth on whether warrants were needed to search private containers
found in vehicles. Part II examines these cases and the Court’s flawed norm that
motorists have diminished privacy interests in closed containers found in cars
when police have probable cause to search. One could view these cases as
adopting a narrower view of motorists’ privacy rights than the view embraced
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by Carroll. More importantly, the understanding that currently permits
warrantless searches of suitcases and purses under the automobile exception, if
meant to be a neutral principle, would also allow warrantless searches of
computers and cell phones found in cars. I examine whether today’s Court is
likely to apply the automobile exception to searches of computers, cell phones,
and other electronic devices found in vehicles.
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Automobile travel is a basic, pervasive, and often necessary mode of
transportation to and from one’s home, workplace, and leisure activities.
Many people spend more hours each day traveling in cars than walking on
the streets. Undoubtedly, many find a greater sense of security and privacy
in traveling in an automobile than they do in exposing themselves by
pedestrian or other modes of travel.
—Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662 (1979).

[T]he right to be secure against searches and seizures is one of the most
difficult to protect. Since the officers are themselves the chief invaders,
there is no enforcement outside of court.
...
We must remember that the extent of any privilege of search and seizure
without warrant which we sustain, the officers interpret and apply
themselves and will push to the limit.
—Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 181-82 (1949)
(Jackson, J., dissenting).

All in all, the case should be reversed for purposes of justice, for the man
apparently is guilty and no one seems to deny that.
—Harry Blackmun, Internal Memorandum on
Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974) (No. 72-1603) Page 3.
Harry Blackmun Papers, Manuscript Division,
Library of Congress, Box 182, Folder 9.
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INTRODUCTION
Police officers have always kept a close watch on motorists’ actions and
movements. As a result, motorists’ liberty to travel without government
disturbance and the state’s power to investigate criminality have shared an
uneasy coexistence. For example, at the start of the twentieth century, certain
sectors of society saw the automobile as a place for illicit behavior. A lawyer for
the American Social Hygiene Association stated that:
[T]he automobile prostitute . . . is the bane of law enforcement
officials. . . . Few city police departments, or country sheriffs . . . are
sufficiently equipped with motorcycle police to patrol the city streets and
country roads, and the prostitute may indefinitely vary the scene of her
operations, or the car itself may be used if necessary. 1
On another occasion, a juvenile judge asserted that “the automobile has
become a house of prostitution on wheels.”2 The convenience and efficiency of
automobile travel, as contrasted with travel by train, made enforcement of the
1910 Mann Act, which criminalized transporting women across state lines for
prostitution “or any other immoral purpose,” more difficult for federal agents. 3
Just as automobiles made investigating Mann Act offenses more arduous, a
decade later, cars made enforcing the Eighteenth Amendment’s nationwide ban
on alcohol more complicated for law enforcement generally. During Prohibition,
police officers not only scrutinized bootleggers but also directed their
investigations “to people not used to being policed.”4 In other words, Americans
from all walks of life were subject to police surveillance, intrusive seizures, and
expansive searches, which had previously been directed at the so-called criminal
element of society.5 It did not help relations between police and the citizenry
that automobiles were seized and subjected to invasive searches based on flimsy
grounds or that the methods employed by the police were sometimes random

1

DAVID J. LANGUM, CROSSING OVER THE LINE: LEGISLATING MORALITY AND THE MANN
ACT 131 (1994) (omissions in original) (quoting BASCOM JOHNSON, NEXT STEPS 4-5 (1918)).
2
Id.; see also JESSICA R. PLILEY, POLICING SEXUALITY: THE MANN ACT AND THE MAKING
OF THE FBI 137 (2014) (noting that “nothing would exemplify the connections between
consumer culture, youth culture, sex, and immorality more than that great emblem of
American ingenuity, economic power, and consumerism—the automobile”).
3
PLILEY, supra note 2, at 137 (“Because of the privacy and independence afforded by cars,
Bureau agents often had more difficulty tracking down suspects, retracing the journeys to
interview witnesses, and determining exactly what had happened in the car.”).
4
SARAH A. SEO, POLICING THE OPEN ROAD: HOW CARS TRANSFORMED AMERICAN
FREEDOM 119 (2019).
5
Cf. LISA MCGIRR, THE WAR ON ALCOHOL: PROHIBITION AND THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN
STATE, at xix (2016) (“In many places, men and women flagrantly violated the law. Among
them, a small, affluent group of self-proclaimed avant-garde challenged the constricting
norms they associated with Prohibition in a new world of vibrant, experimental, and
permissive leisure.”).
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and violent.6 Indeed, because enforcement of the Eighteenth Amendment often
required police to undertake actions that violated the Fourth Amendment’s
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures, one legal commentator
urged the Supreme Court to “recognize frankly that the 4th Amendment is
inconsistent with the 18th” and “that the 4th Amendment has actually been
repealed, where enforcement of the Volstead Act is concerned.”7
In modern times, some police officers have been forthright about their reasons
for stopping and investigating certain motorists:
A patrolman ran a warrant check on a car with a broken rear taillight and
four young blacks in it. He found the car had a warrant, and stopped the car
and checked the driver for warrants. The driver was not wanted, and the
patrolman did not cite him for the rear taillight because, as he put it, the
man had the “right attitude.” Later the patrolman said he investigated the
car in the first place because there were blacks in it, and with blacks “there
is always a greater chance of something wrong.”8

6

See Beverly Gage, America’s Long Hangover, THE NATION (Apr. 27, 2016),
https://www.thenation.com/article/americas-long-hangover/ [https://perma.cc/F7KE-2SJX]
(“Prohibition itself turned out to be a law-enforcement extravaganza, in which the police,
politicians, and judges had to figure out how to force people to obey a law that they didn’t
much like. In the end, most Americans concluded that highly coercive policing, a massive
administrative apparatus, and a hefty tax burden were too high a price to pay for slightly
healthier livers and supposedly cleaner, more godly behavior.”). See generally WESLEY M.
OLIVER, THE PROHIBITION ERA AND POLICING: A LEGACY OF MISREGULATION 39 (2018)
(noting that the “new effort at vice regulation led to indiscriminate searches that eroded the
trust the public had in the police. Prohibition created enormous opportunities for corrupt
officers, and liquor searches by honest officers involved intrusions on privacy, destruction of
property, and not infrequent acts of physical violence”). For an example of a particularly
aggressive police stop of an automobile, consider the arrest of Fred Gibbons:
A man named Fred Gibbons was driving through [Ritzville, Washington,] when the
sheriff—apparently on a tip from a bootlegger—jumped on Gibbons’ automobile,
pushed a gun in his face, and forced him to drive to the County Court House, where a
justice of the peace issued a warrant. Gibbons had a few bottles of liquor in a suitcase
and was charged with unlawful possession. The [Washington] Supreme Court reversed
his conviction, [ruling that the arrest of Gibbons was illegal].
NORMAN H. CLARK, THE DRY YEARS: PROHIBITION AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN WASHINGTON 15657 (1965) (citing State v. Gibbons, 203 P. 390, 391-96 (Wash. 1922)).
7
Frederic A. Johnson, Some Constitutional Aspects of Prohibition Enforcement, 97 CENT.
L.J. 113, 122-23 (1924). This view did not go unchallenged. See Thomas E. Atkinson,
Prohibition and the Doctrine of the Weeks Case, 23 MICH. L. REV. 748, 749 (1925) (“[T]he
Eighteenth Amendment is merely an enlargement of the federal power to deal with liquor
offenses and was never intended to alter in any way the constitutional safeguards and personal
guarantees.”).
8
MICHAEL K. BROWN, WORKING THE STREET: POLICE DISCRETION AND THE DILEMMAS OF
REFORM 170 (1988).
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In December 1986, Sheriff Harry Lee of Jefferson Parish, Louisiana,
announced that his deputies would routinely stop black motorists driving in
white neighborhoods. The Sheriff stated that his deputies would
stop everybody that we think has no business in the neighborhood. . . . It’s
obvious that two young blacks driving a rinky-dink car in a predominately
white-neighborhood—I’m not talking about on the main thoroughfare, but
if they’re on one of the side streets and they’re cruising around—they’ll be
stopped.9
A North Carolina State Trooper, C.J. Carroll, told a defense lawyer that he
patrolled two areas of Durham “for the purpose of looking for Hispanic males.” 10
The defense lawyer
further inquired, if all her client had done was exit the store with a carton
of beer, why did Trooper Carroll stop him. Trooper Carroll responded:
“Everyone knows that a Hispanic male buying liquor on a Friday or a
Saturday night is probably already drunk”; “Mexicans drink a lot because
they grew up where the water isn’t good”; and that he did not care what
happened in court “as long as I get them [(i.e. Hispanic males)] off the road
and in jail for one night.” Finally, when asked if he targets Hispanics,
Trooper Carroll stated: “I’m not targeting Hispanics. Most of my tickets go
to blacks.”11
Under our constitutional system, the Supreme Court is in charge of protecting
motorists from unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court, however, has
been consistently bad at defending motorists’ Fourth Amendment rights. To be
sure, the Court has issued opinions where individuals have prevailed against the
government in “car” cases.12 But for almost a century, the Court has steadily
9

J. Michael Kennedy, Sheriff Rescinds Order to Stop Blacks in White Areas, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 4, 1986, pt. 1, at 18. After his announcement, Sheriff Lee apologized and rescinded his
order. Id.
10
State v. Villeda, 599 S.E.2d 62, 64 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004). Thanks to Professor Gabriel
Chin for alerting me to this case.
11
Id. (alteration in original).
12
See, e.g., Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1531 (2018) (holding that “the mere
fact that a driver in lawful possession or control of a rental car is not listed on the rental
agreement will not defeat his or her otherwise reasonable expectation of privacy” in the rental
vehicle); Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1612 (2015) (holding that dog sniff
conducted after completion of traffic stop violated Fourth Amendment because there was no
basis for prolonging the stop); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402 (2012) (finding that
attaching GPS device to vehicle constitutes search within Fourth Amendment); City of
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 46 (2000) (finding that suspicionless checkpoints to
detect narcotics violated Fourth Amendment because otherwise “law enforcement authorities
would be able to establish checkpoints for virtually any purpose so long as they also included
a license or sobriety check”); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 766 (1979) (“[W]e hold that
the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment applies to personal luggage taken from an
automobile to the same degree it applies to such luggage in other locations.”), abrogated by
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rejected Fourth Amendment claims pressed by individuals in cases involving
automobiles. Often in explaining its rulings, the Court claims that car cases are
different from other search-and-seizure issues.13 But a close analysis of the
Court’s reasoning discloses that something else motivates the Justices’ results.
In fact, the Court’s logic in car cases is often based on fictitious claims about
motorists’ privacy interests, intellectually dishonest reasoning, and a candid
desire to expand the discretion and power of law enforcement officers to stop
and search motorists. Along the way, the Court has permitted law enforcement
officers to stop and interrogate motorists near the southern border based on their
Mexican ancestry14 and, most unfortunately, turned a blind eye to pretextual
traffic stops targeting black and Hispanic drivers for suspicionless criminal
investigations.15
Professor Sarah Seo’s new book, Policing the Open Road: How Cars
Transformed American Freedom, vividly and expertly describes America’s
history of “policing cars . . . as it fast became an automotive society.” 16
Professor Seo’s book outlines the “practical, theoretical, and legal problems of
policing everybody who drove.”17 Because of the eventual ubiquity of cars and
the pervasive regulation of motorists, police were afforded “discretion to
administer the massive traffic enforcement regime and deal with the sensitivities
of ‘law-abiding’ citizens who kept violating traffic laws.” 18 Discretionary police
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979)
(finding that, except in exceptional circumstances, it is unreasonable under Fourth
Amendment to stop car and detain driver to check his or her license and registration);
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 480 (1971) (plurality opinion) (finding
warrantless search of car unreasonable because law enforcement officials had time and means
to secure a warrant to authorize the search).
13
See, e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009) (explaining that second prong of
its holding—that police may search interior of car incident to arrest “when it is ‘reasonable to
believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle’”—is attributable
to “circumstances unique to the vehicle context” (quoting Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S.
615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring))); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 442 (1973)
(stating that cars are different from houses not only due to their mobility but also because of
“fact that extensive, and often noncriminal contact with automobiles . . . bring[s] local
officials in ‘plain view’ of evidence, fruits, or instrumentalities of a crime, or contraband”).
Tellingly, Gant “deemed it unnecessary to state or even hint at what these unique
circumstances are” that made cars different for purposes of a search incident to arrest. 3
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT,
§ 7.1(d), at 719 (5th ed. 2012).
14
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 545 (1976) (holding that stopping
vehicle at fixed checkpoint near border even though there is “no reason to believe the
particular vehicle contains illegal aliens” is consistent with Fourth Amendment).
15
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 819 (1996) (holding that probable cause renders
stop reasonable under Fourth Amendment, despite argument that stop was pretextual).
16
SEO, supra note 4, at 8.
17
Id.
18
Id.

2019]

COPS AND CARS

2325

power “profoundly altered what it meant to live free from state intrusion in the
Automotive Age.”19 Seo’s book illuminates the nexus between this history of
policing cars and “the history of American criminal justice and its troubled
present.”20
More specifically, Policing the Open Road is required reading for Fourth
Amendment buffs.21 Judges, lawyers, law professors, and law students interested
in understanding the history of American search and seizure law should read this
book. Seo’s hypothesis is direct: “Examining the spate of car cases in state and
federal courts that began in the 1920s and persisted throughout the century
reveals a startling revelation: Fourth Amendment jurisprudence evolved not just
to limit police discretion, as we have learned, but also to accommodate it.” 22 Of
course, her thesis is at odds with the traditional descriptions of the Supreme
Court’s search and seizure doctrine. Under the standard interpretations, the
Warren Court, starting in the early 1960s, commenced the “due process
revolution,”23 which was designed to protect the constitutional rights of criminal
suspects. Seo’s book proffers an alternative account: “[I]n fact, American courts
did more to encourage and sustain, rather than to check, the police’s growing
authority.”24 Without questioning the significance and correctness of the Warren
Court’s renowned cases, such as Mapp v. Ohio,25 Seo contends that “[o]nce we
examine the celebrated decisions alongside the underbelly of criminal
procedure—the thousands of car cases that justified police action—the judicial
endorsement of greater discretionary policing becomes undeniable.”26
According to Seo, judicial approval of police discretionary power to
investigate motorists was no accident. As in other Fourth Amendment contexts,
the critical issue was whether police would need a judicial warrant to seize or
search a vehicle.27 After the Court’s 1925 landmark ruling in Carroll v. United
States28 effectively eliminated the need for police to seek judicial authorization
before searching or seizing automobiles—as they must do before entering homes
or seizing personal papers—judges deferred to the police when defendants
challenged searches or seizures of their cars.

19

Id.
Id.
21
See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV.
349, 349 (1974) (coining term “fourth amendment buff”).
22
SEO, supra note 4, at 17.
23
FRED P. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND 28 (1970).
24
SEO, supra note 4, at 18.
25
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
26
SEO, supra note 4, at 18.
27
Id. at 16 (“At stake in this legal question was the very legitimacy of discretion at the
heart of police governance. Requiring officers to get a warrant from a magistrate would hold
up their efforts to proactively investigate crime. Conversely, eliminating the warrant
requirement would allow the police to act according to their own judgement.”).
28
267 U.S. 132 (1925).
20
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When faced with the exigencies of automobility—and especially when
those caught red-handed, not the wrongly suspected, were typically the
ones who brought Fourth Amendment challenges—judges tended to side
with order and security and conclude that zealous and intrusive police
action for the sake of the public welfare was reasonable and did not
compromise the values of a democratic society. 29
Rather than protecting motorists, judges interpreted the Fourth Amendment’s
text—which, inter alia, mandates a right of the people to be free from
“unreasonable” searches and seizures—as a tool for investigation. 30 As in other
Fourth Amendment contexts where judges employ a reasonableness model to
decide cases, a reasonableness theory in car cases did not encourage principled
judicial results. Judges found it “difficult to pin down a definition of reasonable
policing, let alone flesh out a coherent theory for determining reasonableness,
when patrolling the byways and highways presented a myriad of unexpected
situations and often involved split-second decision-making.”31 Rather than
announce “neutral principles,”32 judges did what judges often do in Fourth
Amendment cases—defer to the police.33
Professor Seo explains that the reasonableness model utilized by judges to
resolve car cases eventually “accumulated into judicial rules, which became
more numerous, more specific, and more complex.”34 Fourth Amendment rules
for vehicles became a procedural regime “in the sense that they direct how the
police should police, unlike substantive rights, which secure the right to be free
from government, including police, intrusion.”35 Seo wonders why “the justices
settled on procedural rights [in car cases] to protect individuals from the police,
rather than, for example, a substantive privacy right not to have one’s car
searched.”36 In the next paragraph, she answers the question: the Court rejected
29

SEO, supra note 4, at 19.
The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
31
SEO, supra note 4, at 19.
32
Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1, 16 (1959).
33
SEO, supra note 4, at 19 (“[R]easonableness functioned as a deferential standard. This
deference, in turn, gave the police even more power.”); id. at 220 (“In the history of twentiethcentury criminal procedure, jurists applied the reasonableness standard to empower, not to
limit, police discretion.”). Because of the deference judges gave to law enforcement interests
in car cases, Seo believes that “[f]rom the perspective of cars, the Due Process Revolution
was not much of an overthrow of the existing order.” Id. at 19.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 19-20.
30
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substantive rights—and declined to impose a warrant requirement for certain
searches associated with cars—because substantive protection would have
limited the “discretionary policing that the ‘law-abiding’ wanted.”37 The choice
of procedure over substance meant that “minorities and the poor . . . received
rules regulating the police’s ever-growing power.”38 The consequence “was not
protection of individuals’ privacy in their cars but the empowerment of highway
patrollers and traffic cops who could take advantage of the thicket of procedures
to exercise their power in discretionary, even discriminatory, ways.” 39 In the
end, motorists were subject to discretionary policing, and everyone lost some of
their freedom.
Policing the Open Road offers insights and astute analysis on many of the
Court’s important Fourth Amendment car cases. Space constraints preclude me
from commenting on all of the cases and topics Seo probes. Instead, I focus on
Professor Seo’s analyses of Carroll v. United States and Brinegar v. United
States.40 Carroll is important because it was the Court’s first car case.
Furthermore, understanding Carroll—and Brinegar, which solidified and
expanded Carroll’s holding—is essential because—nearly one hundred years
later—its logic continues to direct how the modern Court resolves motorists’
Fourth Amendment claims.41 Put simply, a majority of today’s Justices view
motorists’ Fourth Amendment rights essentially the same way that a majority of
the Justices did in 1925. Specifically, Part I of this Article highlights Seo’s major
assertions regarding Carroll; Carroll’s influence on another controversial search
and seizure decision, Terry v. Ohio,42 which upheld an officer’s power to stop
and frisk a person he suspects is armed and dangerous; and finally, Carroll’s
connection to the police authority upheld by the Justices that permits the
discretionary and discriminatory policing that currently pervades America’s
highways and roads.
Part II focuses on the modern Court’s understanding of motorists’ privacy.
Carroll’s vision of how the Fourth Amendment applies to searching cars was
not inescapable. While many lawyers and law students today might not believe
it, not so long ago several members of the Burger Court took the view that cars
should be treated like other effects under the Fourth Amendment—which meant
the warrant requirement would apply to cars. Though a majority of Justices
never embraced the view that warrants are required to search the interior of
vehicles, in a series of cases the Court went back and forth on whether warrants
were needed to search private containers found in vehicles. Part II examines
37

Id. at 20.
Id.
39
Id.
40
338 U.S. 160 (1949).
41
Cf. Craig S. Lerner, The Reasonableness of Probable Cause, 81 TEX. L. REV. 951, 987
(2003) (describing Carroll as having “lasting influence” on approval of warrantless
automobile searches).
42
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
38
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these cases and the Court’s flawed norm that motorists have diminished privacy
interests in closed containers found in cars when police have probable cause to
search. Remarkably, the modern Court has embraced a narrower view of
motorists’ privacy rights than the view announced in Carroll. More importantly,
the understanding that currently permits warrantless searches of suitcases and
purses under the automobile exception, if meant to be a neutral principle, would
also allow warrantless searches of computers and cell phones found in cars.
I.

BAD FROM THE BEGINNING—Carroll v. United States

Professor Seo begins her analysis of the automobile’s impact on Fourth
Amendment doctrine at the right place: Carroll v. United States. What makes
Seo’s book so good is that she explores and offers insights into Carroll not
offered in other studies of this seminal ruling. While the facts in Carroll are
familiar to constitutional criminal procedure professors, law school casebooks
typically provide only a passing reference to Carroll.43 There is no discussion of
Carroll in the casebooks describing it as a controversial ruling44 and there is
certainly nothing that links Carroll to the discretionary and race-based policing
of motorists that exists today.
Carroll was a Prohibition case. The Eighteenth Amendment’s nationwide ban
on “the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors” 45 was highly
controversial, and it deeply divided Americans. The federal government’s
efforts at enforcing Prohibition were equally divisive, if not more so.46 “During
43

See, e.g., YALE KAMISAR ET AL., BASIC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 376 (15th ed. 2019). Law
students learn that Carroll announced the rule that police may search a vehicle found traveling
on the road when there is probable cause that the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of
criminality and it is impractical to obtain a warrant.
44
In a recent law review article, two scholars described Carroll as “venerable.” Gabriel J.
Chin & Charles J. Vernon, Reasonable but Unconstitutional: Racial Profiling and the Radical
Objectivity of Whren v. United States, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 882, 906 (2015). For a highly
critical assessment of Carroll from an originalist perspective, see generally Thomas J. Snyder,
My Car Is My Castle: The Failed Historical Roots of the Vehicle Exception to the Fourth
Amendment, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (on file with the Boston University Law
Review). Professor Robert Post provides a magnificent and extremely informative analysis of
Carroll, relying on the papers of members of the Taft Court, contemporaneous legal
scholarship, and other search and seizure rulings from the Taft Court. See Robert Post,
Federalism, Positive Law, and the Emergence of the American Administrative State:
Prohibition in the Taft Court Era, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 116-37 (2006). For anyone
interested in understanding the Justices’ motivations in Carroll, Professor Post’s article is
essential reading.
45
U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
46
Post, supra note 44, at 11 (“In contrast to the enforcement of state and local prohibition
laws that predated prohibition, federal efforts to enforce the Eighteenth Amendment were so
conspicuously ineffectual that widespread violation of prohibition became, in [President
Warren] Harding’s words, a ‘nation-wide scandal’ that was ‘the most demoralizing factor in
our public life.’” (footnotes omitted)).
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the 1920s the Supreme Court, under the leadership of Chief Justice William
Howard Taft, was at the storm center of prohibition enforcement.” 47 The Taft
Court was “grimly committed to the success of prohibition.”48 At the same time,
the Taft Court accepted the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule, which
required that evidence obtained by unconstitutional searches and seizures by
federal officers not be used in federal criminal trials. The upshot was that
“prohibition sparked a virtual ‘doctrinal explosion’ of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.”49 And the Prohibition cases of the Taft Court
reflected a sharp break with earlier decisions interpreting the Fourth
Amendment. Most conspicuously, the Court abandoned the rule of liberal
construction of the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment.
Instead, it interpreted the amendment to permit a variety of intrusive
enforcement actions by prohibition authorities.
The most obvious result of the Supreme Court decisions was to limit the
occasions when enforcement agents had to obtain warrants. 50
Put simply, Prohibition enforcement was a game changer for the Fourth
Amendment.51
Shortly after the start of Prohibition, federal Prohibition agents and a
Michigan law enforcement officer were looking for bootleggers on the road
between Detroit and Grand Rapids when an Oldsmobile Roadster drove past.52
One of the feds, Fred Cronenwett, suspected that George Carroll was in the
Roadster.53 Cronenwett had encountered Carroll and two others, John Kiro and
a man named Kruska, a few months earlier during an undercover operation.54

47

Id. at 7.
Id. at 42.
49
Id. at 117 (footnote omitted).
50
KENNETH M. MURCHISON, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW DOCTRINES: THE FORGOTTEN
INFLUENCE OF NATIONAL PROHIBITION 68 (1994). Query whether modern law students
understand the nexus between the enforcement of Prohibition and the Fourth Amendment
rules they learn. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 469 (1928) (holding that
wiretapping of Roy Olmstead’s bootlegging operations did not constitute Fourth Amendment
search or seizure), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925) (holding warrantless search of automobile based on probable
cause constitutional); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58-59 (1924) (holding that police
trespass on person’s private property to seize liquor in open fields was not search under Fourth
Amendment).
51
See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths
and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 842-43 (2004) (“The National Prohibition
Act of 1919 changed everything. . . . The federal courts began to hear a regular run of Fourth
Amendment cases as federal agents investigated illegal alcohol schemes.”).
52
Carroll, 267 U.S. at 135.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 134-35.
48
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The three had arrived at the meeting in an Oldsmobile Roadster.55 Cronenwett
proposed to buy whiskey from Carroll.56 The three left, purportedly to obtain the
whiskey, but “in a short time Kruska came back and said they could not get it
that night, that the man who had it was not in, but that they would deliver it the
next day.”57 The sale never occurred.
When Cronenwett again saw the Oldsmobile Roadster on the highway, he
suspected that “the Carroll boys” were up to no good.58 After stopping the
Roadster occupied by Carroll and Kiro, the officers searched the car, but initially
found no liquor.59 “They were about to let the duo go when Cronenwett struck
something hard, so hard that it ‘was practically solid,’ in the cushion of the back
seat.”60 Inside, the officers found sixty-eight bottles of “blended Scotch
whiskey” and “Gordon gin.”61 Carroll and Kiro were arrested notwithstanding
Carroll’s offer to Cronenwett to “[t]ake the liquor and give us one more chance
and I will make it right with you.”62
After the defendants were convicted of violating the Volstead Act,63 they
appealed to the Court contending that the seizure and search of the Oldsmobile
and their subsequent arrest violated the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, the
defendants argued that stopping the vehicle constituted a “seizure,” which was
the equivalent of an arrest for constitutional purposes and required a judicial
warrant based on probable cause of criminality. The common law allowed
warrantless arrests if police had probable cause of a felony or had personally
observed a misdemeanor that was a breach of the peace. Counsel for the
defendants, however, reminded the Court that one agent had testified that the
officers “‘had no reason to believe that the [defendants] were transporting
liquor’ before stopping and searching the Oldsmobile. And without a lawful
seizure or arrest, the officers could not conduct a warrantless search.”64

55

Id. at 135.
Id. (noting that Cronenwett used alias and sought to buy three cases of whiskey for $130
per case).
57
Id.
58
Id. at 160.
59
SEO, supra note 4, at 114.
60
Id.
61
Carroll, 267 U.S. at 136.
62
Id.
63
The Volstead Act, officially known as the National Prohibition Act, was enacted by
Congress to implement the Eighteenth Amendment’s nationwide ban on the manufacture,
sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors. National Prohibition Act, Pub. L. No. 66-66, 41
Stat. 305, 305 (1919), repealed by Liquor Law Repeal and Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 74347, 49 Stat. 872, 872 (1935) (repealing Titles I and II and amending Title III of Volstead
Act).
64
SEO, supra note 4, at 115 (alteration in original) (quoting Brief of Plaintiffs in Error on
Reargument at 2, Carroll, 267 U.S. 132 (No. 15), 1924 WL 25789, at *2 [hereinafter
Plaintiffs’ Brief]).
56
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Without disputing the defense’s legal position, the government urged the
Justices to ignore the common law rule of arrest because cars were different:
“The use of such motor vehicles by criminals . . . demands that our ancient law
be so amended as to cope with these modern facilities . . . .” 65 The government
told the Court that “a lower standard than even probable cause was necessary
when cars were involved.”66 Counsel for defendants rejoined that if the Court
adopted the government’s position “[s]earches of vehicles on the highway will[,]
if promiscuously permitted[,] lead to great abuses.”67 Thus, the Justices
confronted a dilemma:
Because cars provided both the getaway and a cover for hiding things,
officers not only had insufficient time to get a warrant but also usually had
only mere suspicion, short of probable cause or knowledge, that a car was
transporting illicit goods. And because so many people drove and their cars
looked, well, standardized, any rule on the police’s authority when applied
to the automobile would affect the lawbreaking and the law-abiding alike.68
While the advent of the automobile raised thorny concerns for Fourth
Amendment rules, Professor Seo intimates that another dynamic may have been
on the Justices’ minds in Carroll. Eleven years before the Court decided Carroll,
it ruled in Weeks v. United States69 that evidence obtained from an illegal search
or seizure was inadmissible in federal court.70 Professor Seo states that the
exclusionary mandate announced in Weeks “soon proved as divisive as
Prohibition itself.”71 Indeed, she believes that the issue “of exclusion became
synonymous with the substantive matter of outlawing liquor.”72 Carroll was
argued twice. The case “first appeared on the docket for the 1923 term, but the
justices asked the parties to argue the case again the following year.” 73 In their
brief on reargument, the defendants remarked, “We cannot believe that this court
is contemplating overruling the principle announced in Weeks v. United
States.”74
65

Substituted Brief for the United States on Reargument at 77, Carroll, 267 U.S. 132 (No.
15), 1924 WL 25788, at *77 (statement of N.Y.C. Police Commissioner R.E. Enright).
66
SEO, supra note 4, at 115.
67
Plaintiffs’ Brief, supra note 64, at 13.
68
SEO, supra note 4, at 115-16.
69
232 U.S. 383 (1914), overruled by Mapps v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
70
Id. at 398-99.
71
SEO, supra note 4, at 120.
72
Id. at 120; see also ARTHUR W. BLAKEMORE, NATIONAL PROHIBITION 514 (2d ed. 1925)
(noting that “as the federal courts have been bound to follow” Weeks, “state courts have felt
free to disregard it”); Atkinson, supra note 7, at 749 (stating that “prohibition plus the violent
criticism of the legal principles announced in the Weeks case has made the doctrine a virtual
battle-ground” in state courts (footnote omitted)).
73
SEO, supra note 4, at 123.
74
Plaintiffs’ Brief, supra note 64, at 15. Professor Post offers another reason for the
reargument in Carroll. According to Post, the Justices had originally voted to affirm the
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As one legal chronicler of Prohibition recognized before Carroll was decided,
“[o]ne of the most important practical difficulties in the enforcement of
prohibition is that involved in the transportation of liquor by vehicle.”75 There
were too many automobiles that looked alike. And if police “cannot stop and
search vehicles which they strongly suspect of illegal transportation[,] they
cannot stop the traffic at all and the [federal prohibition] law will be made
nugatory.”76 Although judges in prohibition cases “seem[ed] to agree that an
automobile cannot be searched without cause[,] still many courts are seizing on
various elements of suspicion as justifying such searches and holding further
that the finding of liquor may be itself a sufficient justification.” 77 Carroll would
not embrace this position, but it came close to doing so.
Furthermore, Professor Seo suggests that a more nuanced dilemma
confronted Chief Justice Taft, the author of Carroll:
The difficulty of the case for Taft stemmed from the fact that the Eighteenth
Amendment was the law of the land. The American people had voted to
make it part of the US Constitution. Certainly, the police had to respect
constitutional limits on their actions. But citizens had to obey the law as
well. On the one hand, the Fourth Amendment was on the line. On the other
hand, noncompliance eroded the Eighteenth. Many judges, including Taft,
were originally against National Prohibition. But once it was ratified, they
believed that the rule of law demanded obedience, which, it quickly
became clear, depended on greater police enforcement. At stake was the
rule of law. The dilemma was that it cut both ways.78
Solicitor General James Beck provided Taft with a way to resolve Carroll
without seemingly having to choose between protecting the Fourth Amendment

convictions, and Justice McReynolds was assigned the opinion. Post, supra note 44, at 123
n.406. McReynolds changed his mind (and vote), which “evidently caused the case to be
reargued.” Id. After reargument, Taft took over writing the opinion. Id. Professor Post’s
research also reveals that the Justices were divided about the result in Carroll and, at one point
during deliberations, a majority of Justices had voted in favor of the defendants. Id. Finally,
Post’s examination of Taft’s papers reveals the Chief Justice’s determination to uphold the
search and his animosity toward automobiles. See id. (noting that after majority agreed to
affirm convictions, Taft wrote to his brother: “I am rejoiced because I think it important to
establish the correct principle in respect to the search of this instrument of evil the
automobile”); id. at 125 n.408 (quoting Taft’s personal correspondence two years before
Carroll was decided: “[T]he automobile is the greatest instrument for promoting immunity of
crimes of violence that I know of in the history of civilization” and “is the greatest instrument
to promote immunity from punishment for crime that we have had introduced in many, many
years, and we haven’t as yet neutralized its effect”).
75
BLAKEMORE, supra note 72, at 475-76.
76
Id. at 476.
77
Id.
78
SEO, supra note 4, at 123.
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or enforcing Prohibition.79 The government’s brief “reframed Carroll as a case
not about liquor but about how the automobile had completely transformed
American society.”80 Rather than debate the soundness of Prohibition or the
importance of the Fourth Amendment, the Court should focus on the car. The
government urged the Justices to look beyond the fact that the search of Carroll’s
vehicle facilitated enforcement of Prohibition; future cases could involve more
violent offenses with criminals fleeing in cars. The advent of the automobile
necessitated that the Court rethink “‘the well-settled rules of the common law’
regarding an officer’s authority to search and to seize.”81 Whether intentional or
not, Solicitor General Beck’s82 strategy fit nicely with Chief Justice Taft’s view
that the automobile was an “instrument of evil” 83 that should be “neutralized.”84
Ultimately, as Seo explains, Carroll made new law. Typically, when the
Court issues an opinion granting police additional powers to invade
constitutional freedom, the Court will offer platitudes about the importance of
the right at stake and warn that it will not tolerate government abuse of the newly
granted power. Chief Justice Taft followed that script in Carroll when he offered
throwaway dicta that “[i]t would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition
agent were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor
and thus subject all persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience
and indignity of such a search.”85 And he also stated that “[i]n cases where the
securing of a warrant is reasonably practicable, it must be used.”86 The latter
remark suggested that whether police needed a warrant to search a car “depended
79

During the 1920s, some lawyers, legal commentators, and even a few federal judges
openly questioned the compatibility of Fourth Amendment rights and effective enforcement
of the Eighteenth Amendment. See Post, supra note 44, at 118-19. For example, in 1924, the
Fourth Circuit wrote: “The constitutional expression, ‘unreasonable searches,’ is not fixed
and absolute in meaning. The meaning in some degree must change with changing social,
economic and legal conditions. The obligation to enforce the Eighteenth Amendment is no
less solemn than that to give effect to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.” Milam v. United
States, 296 F. 629, 631 (4th Cir. 1924). More directly, for some, the need to enforce the
Eighteenth Amendment meant diminishing the scope and meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
80
SEO, supra note 4, at 124.
81
Id.
82
Interestingly, James Beck opposed federal prohibition on federalism grounds. JAMES M.
BECK, THE REVOLT AGAINST PROHIBITION 14-15 (1930) (“[T]he leaders of prohibition showed
scant respect for the Constitution when they wrote this illegitimate amendment into that noble
instrument and thus destroyed its perfect symmetry and turned a wise compact of government
into a mere police code.”).
83
Post, supra note 44, at 123 n.406.
84
Id. at 125 n.408.
85
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54 (1925). A few lines later, Taft added that
“those lawfully within the country, entitled to use the public highways, have a right to free
passage without interruption or search” unless officers have probable cause that the vehicle
contains contraband or illegal merchandise. Id. at 154.
86
Id. at 156 (emphasis added).
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on the exigencies of the situation”—in other words, the validity of a car search
“turned on whether the officer had enough time” to get a warrant from a
magistrate.87
After acknowledging the obvious difference between a search of a home or
other structure—for “which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained”—
and a search of a ship, wagon, or automobile—for which it is impractical to
87
SEO, supra note 4, at 137. A few years later, two rulings, also involving prohibition
enforcement, suggested that the Court would not take seriously Taft’s admonition that
warrants “must be used” when officers may practically obtain them: Husty v. United States,
282 U.S. 694 (1931), upheld a warrantless search of a parked car for alcohol by federal
officers on the grounds that the officers “could not know when Husty would come to the car
or how soon it would be removed.” Id. at 701. “Even though several officers took part in the
search, the Court did not think it was necessary for one of them to secure a warrant while
leaving the car under the watchful eye of the others.” JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 91 (1966). Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938),
held that where an officer has probable cause to search a car observed driving on the road,
“[p]assage of the car into [a private] garage closely followed by the observing officer did not
destroy th[e] right” to search. Id. at 255. Scher, written by Justice McReynolds, who dissented
in Carroll, offered no discussion on why it was impractical for the officer to obtain a warrant.
See id.
By the end of the century, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts stopped pretending that Carroll
demanded warrants to search vehicles in the absence of exigent circumstances. Thus, despite
purporting to follow “the Carroll doctrine,” see California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 579-80
(1991), the modern Court has summarily revoked the notion that a warrant “must be used”
unless an exigency makes it impractical to obtain one. For the Burger Court rulings, see
Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, 261 (1982) (per curiam) (holding that authority to conduct
warrantless search of car “does not vanish once the car has been immobilized; nor does
it depend upon [whether the particular facts show] that the car would have been driven away,
or that its contents would have been tampered with, during the period required for the police
to obtain a warrant”) and Florida v. Meyers, 466 U.S. 380, 382 (1984) (per curiam) (following
Thomas to rule that warrantless search of car that had been impounded and immobilized in a
secured area was valid when based on probable cause). For the Rehnquist Court rulings, see
Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 939 (1996) (per curiam) (explaining that ruling below
“rests on an incorrect reading of the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
requirement) and Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 465 (1999) (per curiam) (same).
All of this hand-wringing on whether Carroll mandated warrants is unnecessary because,
as Justice Scalia once acknowledged, Carroll was never serious about requiring police to get
warrants when practical. See Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 583 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Cases like
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), and Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979),
have taken the ‘preference for a warrant’ seriously, while cases like United States v. Ross, 456
U.S. 798 (1982), and Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), have not.”).
Several years ago, I wrote that “[t]he Carroll Court actually endorsed the warrant
preference rule, although based on the facts it found that the exigencies of the moment
justified an exception.” Tracey Maclin, Justice Thurgood Marshall: Taking the Fourth
Amendment Seriously, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 723, 784 (1991). Seo’s analysis convinces me that
there is an alternative (and better) interpretation of Carroll. See infra notes 92-125 and
accompanying text.
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obtain a warrant “because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality
or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought”88—the penultimate passage
in Carroll proclaimed a rule of reasonableness: the constitutional validity of
stopping and searching a car turns on whether the officer “shall have reasonable
or probable cause for believing that the automobile which he stops and seizes
has contraband liquor therein which is being illegally transported.”89 In support
of this rule, Taft suggested that Congress had authorized a warrantless search of
a car based on probable cause in order to enforce the Prohibition Act but required
a judicial warrant to search a dwelling.90 Taft found that distinction consistent
with the Fourth Amendment because the provision “does not denounce all
searches or seizures, but only such as are unreasonable.”91
A careful reading of Carroll reveals that the legal rule announced by Chief
Justice Taft “went beyond what existing laws permitted.”92 When Carroll was
litigated, the constitutional validity of an arrest turned on whether police had
followed common law rules on arrest. Those rules permitted a warrantless arrest
only if the suspect had committed a felony or if the suspect had committed a
misdemeanor in the presence of the officer that was a breach of the peace.93 “The
Volstead Act made transportation of illegal liquor a misdemeanor, unless the
accused had been guilty of two previous violations of the Act, in which case he
was guilty of a felony.”94 There was no evidence in Carroll that the officers who
arrested the defendants had any reason to believe the defendants were guilty of
a felony under the Act. Moreover, those officers had no basis for believing that
88

Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153.
Id. at 156.
90
Id. at 147.
91
Id.
92
SEO, supra note 4, at 138.
93
See Horace L. Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 MICH. L. REV. 541, 549-50 (1924).
Another Prohibition-era treatise, written prior to Carroll, described the authority of officers
to stop and search cars as follows:
There is no Supreme Court decision on the subject. The test to be applied is this: if, under
the facts of a case, the officer has a reasonable ground to believe by the evidence of his
senses that a crime is being committed in the illegal transportation of intoxicating liquor,
and he does believe it, he has a right to arrest both the defendant and the automobile and
search them for evidence of a crime.
WILLIAM J. MCFADDEN, THE LAW OF PROHIBITION 223 (1925).
The modern Court has not yet addressed whether the “in the presence” requirement for a
valid misdemeanor arrest is a constitutional requirement. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,
532 U.S. 318, 340 n.11 (2001) (“We need not, and thus do not, speculate whether the Fourth
Amendment entails an ‘in the presence’ requirement for purposes of misdemeanor arrests.”);
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 756 (1984) (White, J., dissenting) (stating that
“requirement that a misdemeanor must have occurred in the officer’s presence to justify a
warrantless arrest is not grounded in the Fourth Amendment” (first citing Street v. Surdyka,
492 F.2d 368, 371-72 (4th Cir. 1974); then citing 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE:
A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 5.1 (1978))).
94
Post, supra note 44, at 127.
89
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the defendants were committing a “breach of the peace” in their presence. Thus,
under the common law, the seizure of Carroll’s vehicle and the arrest of the
defendants were illegal and unconstitutional.95
Rather than follow common law rules, however, Taft ruled that the authority
to seize and search Carroll’s vehicle turned on “[t]he rule for determining what
may be required before a seizure may be made by a competent seizing official” 96
and not on whether the defendants were committing a felony or misdemeanor.
More directly, Taft was willing to ignore common law rules for arrest and uphold
the seizure if another basis could be found to justify the officers’ intrusion. Taft
found such a basis by reading the Volstead Act to permit seizures when an
officer “shall have reasonable or probable cause for believing that the
automobile which he stops and seizes has contraband liquor therein which is
being illegally transported.”97 But this was “a very strained reading of the
Volstead Act.”98 The Volstead Act only provided that when an officer:
shall discover any person in the act of transporting in violation of the law,
intoxicating liquors in any . . . automobile . . . , it shall be his duty to seize
any and all intoxicating liquors found therein being transported contrary to
law. Whenever intoxicating liquors transported or possessed illegally shall
be seized by an officer he shall take possession of the . . . automobile . . . ,
and shall arrest any person in charge thereof.99
There is an obvious difference between the expression “shall discover” and
the concept of “probable cause to believe,” as Justice McReynolds noted in his
dissent.100 In sum, Carroll was “constructed on the premise that the Volstead
Act authorized searches and seizures made with probable cause” when in fact
the statute provided no such authorization, and that this “statutory authorization
did not contravene the Fourth Amendment.”101
Furthermore, as Professor Seo explains, “Under the common law for
misdemeanors, warrantless arrests required actual knowledge through personal
observation, not cause for believing. The difference in adding the phrase ‘for
95
Id. at 132 (noting that in “absence of congressional authorization, the defendants’ arrest
was undoubtedly illegal under common law principles”); see also MURCHISON, supra note 50,
at 70 (observing that Carroll altered the law because it “allowed officers to make arrests for
misdemeanors that did not involve a breach of the peace”).
96
Carroll, 267 U.S. at 155.
97
Id. at 156.
98
Post, supra note 44, at 131.
99
National Prohibition Act, Pub. L. No. 66-66, 41 Stat. 305, 315 (1919) (emphasis added),
repealed by Liquor Law Repeal and Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 74-347, 49 Stat. 872, 872
(1935) (repealing Titles I and II and amending Title III of Volstead Act).
100
Carroll, 267 U.S. at 166 (McReynolds, J., dissenting) (“[T]he words ‘shall
discover . . . in the act of transporting in violation of the law’ cannot mean, shall have
reasonable cause to suspect or believe that such transportation is being carried on. To discover
and to suspect are wholly different things.” (omission in original)).
101
Post, supra note 44, at 134 n.441.
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believing’ was the difference between knowledge and suspicion.” 102 By contrast,
Carroll permitted officers to seize a vehicle if they suspected a misdemeanor
was occurring, “[a]nd with a suspicion-based seizure of a car and its driver, the
same officer could then conduct a warrantless search.”103 Thus, Carroll altered
constitutional law principles in at least three ways: it permitted an arrest under
circumstances that did not comply with common law rules of arrest, it eliminated
the need for a warrant to search and seize a “traveling ‘effect,’” and it “relaxed
the standard from knowledge to belief.”104
Carroll nicely proves the old English proverb that “necessity is the mother of
invention.” There was no established common law power to detain a person
short of probable cause. Cars were making enforcing Prohibition especially
difficult.105 “It was nearly impossible for officers to have knowledge of illegal
activity, based on personal observation, when evidence was usually hidden
inside what were essentially movable containers.”106 So, Carroll “created a new
category of seizures short of an arrest—the vehicle stop—which solved several
law enforcement challenges.”107 Today, law students are taught that Carroll
established the “automobile exception.” Rather than create an “exception” to the
warrant requirement, however, Carroll sub silentio altered substantive Fourth
Amendment law.
Because of the logistics and realities of transporting objects in cars, when
police stop suspects under conditions similar to Carroll, they have, at best, a
suspicion—rather than knowledge—of criminal conduct. And because the
Constitution requires probable cause to issue a judicial warrant, magistrates
should not issue warrants under these circumstances.108 I learned from Seo’s
analysis that Carroll did not turn on whether police have sufficient time to obtain
a warrant or even whether they have probable cause as traditionally understood.
102

SEO, supra note 4, at 138.
Id.
104
Id. Chief Justice Taft was well aware that he was altering common law principles. In a
letter to his son, Taft acknowledged that Carroll’s holding created “some rather new
principle.” Post, supra note 44, at 123 n.406. And while he was drafting the Carroll opinion,
Taft told Justice Van Devanter: “I shall try to steer away from the suggestion that we are
introducing any new law and new principle of constitutional construction, but are only
adapting old principles and applying them to new conditions created by the change in the
National policy which the 18th Amendment represents.” Id. As Seo notes, “Taft’s private
admissions were closer to the truth that Carroll had created an entirely new rule.” SEO, supra
note 4, at 138.
105
See H.R. DOC. NO. 71-722, at 23 (1931) (concluding that “smuggling by motor trucks
and automobiles is well organized and is the main factor in land transportation”).
106
SEO, supra note 4, at 138.
107
Id.
108
Cf. id. at 138-39 (noting that because investigation of bootleggers using automobiles
rarely involved “knowledge of illegal activity, based on personal observation . . . Taft did not
craft a warrant exception based only on whether an officer had time to get a warrant. He also
wanted to enable Prohibition agents to investigate suspicious situations”).
103
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“Carroll addressed the lack of both time and legal cause with a lower standard
that empowered officers to pull over any car that seemed reasonably
questionable to them.”109 Put another way, Carroll “constitutionally legitimized
police discretion”110 to stop and search vehicles while pretending to adhere to
the traditional standard of probable cause.111
In addition to creating new law, Chief Justice Taft and the majority in Carroll
also fell prey to a phenomenon that afflicts modern judges. The reasonableness
model embraced by Carroll contained a significant degree of what one Carrollera commentator labeled “judicial charity.” 112 As Seo observed, “Whether the
reasonableness standard would truly serve as a restraint on arbitrary policing
depended on how closely courts would scrutinize the police’s actions.”113
Carroll proved that judges “did not have to be too attentive.” 114 The “gaping
hole” in the government’s claim that there was a legal basis to stop and search
Carroll’s vehicle was the testimony of one of the officers who stated that the
officers “‘had no reason to believe that the [defendants] were transporting
liquor’ before they searched the Roadster.”115 Nevertheless, the Carroll Court
found probable cause for the seizure based on the government’s submissions that
the officers knew the defendants’ identities and their vehicle; that Detroit was a
well-known source for introducing liquor into the country; 116 and that the
109

Id. at 139.
Id.
111
Professor George Thomas disagrees that Carroll “reduced the formulation from
probable cause to suspicion.” E-mail from George Thomas, Bd. of Governors Professor of
Law, Rutgers Law Sch., to Tracey Maclin, Professor of Law, Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law (Aug.
16, 2019, 2:23 PM) (on file with author). According to Thomas, “[t]he formulation in Carroll
and subsequent cases stayed with probable cause though I will gladly agree that there was
NOT probable cause on the facts in Carroll.” Id. Thomas believes that Chief Justice Taft
should have ruled that
police did not need a warrant or knowledge of a misdemeanor to search a car stopped on
the open road as long as they have probable cause but they did not have probable cause
in [Carroll]. But the finding of probable cause in Carroll started a downhill slide to
today.
Id.
112
SEO, supra note 4, at 140 (quoting Has the Rest of the Constitution Been Repealed by
the Eighteenth Amendment?, BALT. SUN, Mar. 4, 1925, at 10).
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id. at 141 (alteration in original). In the Carroll opinion, Chief Justice Taft never
directly confronts this claim. Instead, he notes that defendants’ counsel emphasized “the
statement made by one of the officers that they were not looking for defendants at the
particular time when they appeared.” Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 160 (1925). That
statement, in Taft’s view, was constitutionally irrelevant. Id. (“We do not perceive that [the
statement] has any weight.”).
116
The problem with the Court taking judicial notice of the fact that “Grand Rapids is
about 152 miles from Detroit and that Detroit and its neighborhood along the Detroit
River . . . is one of the most active centers for introducing illegally into this country spirituous
110
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defendants, a few months earlier, had promised to deliver liquor to a federal
officer, but failed to do so.117 “This was, to say the least, a very loose definition
of probable cause.”118 Carroll’s willingness to find probable cause on these facts
“signaled that courts could and would defer to officers’ claimed need for an
investigatory search rather than perform a vigorous, independent review.” 119
For Seo, Carroll “heralded the beginning of the problem of police discretion
in constitutional criminal procedure.”120 She concedes that discretionary
policing was around before Carroll was decided.121 However, Carroll “marked
a turning point”122 because the reasonableness model it embraced required
judges to “decide whether an exercise of discretion was reasonable[,] . . . a
bedeviling question that would be litigated time and time again.”123 Under this
legal model, not surprisingly, “courts’ interpretation of the reasonableness
standard would make space for the police’s power to grow.” 124
A.

The Nexus Between Carroll and Terry

When reading Seo’s book, I did not expect to find, in a chapter critiquing
Carroll, a discussion of another contentious Court ruling expanding police
discretion and search authority, i.e., Terry v. Ohio, which authorized police to
frisk a person for weapons when an officer reasonably suspects that the person

liquors for distribution into the interior,” see Carroll, 267 U.S. at 160, is that this geographic
area encompassed “eighteen large cities with a combined population of more than eighteen
millions [sic] of people within this 136 mile zone adjacent to an ocean or an international
boundary.” Forrest R. Black, A Critique of the Carroll Case, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 1068, 1087
(1929).
117
Carroll, 267 U.S. at 160. The majority’s conclusion that probable cause existed for the
stop and search prompted the dissent to exclaim: “Has it come about that merely because a
man once agreed to deliver whiskey, but did not, he may be arrested whenever thereafter he
ventures to drive an automobile on the road to Detroit!” Id. at 174 (McReynolds, J.,
dissenting).
118
Post, supra note 44, at 135 (quoting Thomas Regnier, The “Loyal Foot Soldier”: Can
the Fourth Amendment Survive the Supreme Court’s War on Drugs?, 72 UMKC L. REV. 631,
645 (2004)); see also MURCHISON, supra note 50, at 70 (stating that Carroll was “willing to
find probable cause on extremely thin evidence. . . . What was missing was any evidence
indicating that the defendants had whiskey at the time they were searched. In short, the
evidence would have existed anytime the defendants drove the automobile in the Detroit
area”); Lerner, supra note 41, at 987 (“The evidence that alcohol was concealed in Carroll’s
trunk was, to put it mildly, underwhelming . . . .”).
119
SEO, supra note 4, at 141.
120
Id. at 142.
121
Id. (“To be sure, discretionary policing as a practice existed long before Carroll.”).
122
Id. at 141.
123
Id. at 142.
124
Id.
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is armed and dangerous.125 Prior to Terry, the lawfulness of an officer’s authority
to detain or frisk a person without probable cause was uncertain at best.
Professor Seo chronicles that, in 1939, Harvard Law Professor Sam Warner was
tasked with “mak[ing] a study of the law of arrest to ascertain whether the police
did, or could, operate within its limitations and, if not, what changes were
necessary to make it both a practical standard of police conduct and a safeguard
of personal liberty.”126 Three years later, Warner produced a model law—the
Uniform Arrest Act—that states could adopt. Warner’s model statute rewrote
the law of arrests. Inter alia, “the act narrowed the definition of arrest by taking
out detentions, interrogations, and frisks.”127 Put simply, the Act gave police
more authority than then-existing law recognized. Interestingly, Seo explains
that Warner cited “just one authority” to support his revamping of common law
principles regarding arrest: Carroll. Paralleling the logic of the government’s
brief in Carroll—which urged the Court to focus not on liquor but on how cars
were impacting society—Warner read Carroll “as a case about the need for the
law to adapt to modern society.”128 The relevant question in Carroll, according
to Warner,
was “not whether [the Volstead Act] extends the powers of peace officers
beyond what they were at the time the Constitution was adopted, but
whether the extensions are reasonable.” If the constitutional scope of police
practices was based not on historic practices but reasonableness in light of
contemporary conditions, then the Uniform Arrest Act “should certainly be
constitutional” . . . .129
The connections between Carroll, the Uniform Arrest Act, and Terry are
undeniable. Seo convincingly connects the dots:
[Terry] first distinguished a “stop” from an arrest and a “frisk” from a fullblown search, and then applied the standard of reasonableness. Like his
predecessor, Chief Justice Earl Warren crafted a rule that split the baby. . . .
Warren, like Taft before him, created an intermediate police option just
short of arrest. In fact, Terry cited Carroll in holding that when “a police
officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to
conclude”—a phrase that was reminiscent of Carroll’s “reasonable or
probable cause for believing”—that “criminal activity may be afoot and
that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently
dangerous, [the officer may perform a frisk for weapons]. . . . Terry created

125

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 31 (1968) (holding that “[s]uch a search is a reasonable
search under the Fourth Amendment, and any weapons seized may properly be introduced in
evidence against the person from whom they were taken”).
126
SEO, supra note 4, at 143.
127
Id. at 147.
128
Id. at 148.
129
Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Sam B. Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28
VA. L. REV. 315, 322-23 (1942)).
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another category of searches and seizures that did not require the police to
have actual knowledge but only “reasonable suspicion.”130
Eventually, Terry and its progeny would significantly expand police authority
to detain and search persons in myriad contexts where police lacked probable
cause to make an arrest or undertake a full-scale search. Indeed, Terry is viewed
“as a touchstone of modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.”131 The expanded
police power and discretion afforded by Terry was justified in the name of
“reasonableness.”132 Steering Terry “was the logic of Carroll that the
transformations in modern America necessitated a new relationship between
citizens and the police.”133 Further, in “an automotive society, case law on
130

Id. at 151.
John Q. Barrett, Deciding the Stop and Frisk Cases: A Look Inside the Supreme Court’s
Conference, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 749, 753 (1998).
132
Id. at 823 (discussing Justice Brennan’s letter to Chief Justice Warren, during
deliberations of Terry, wherein Brennan wrote that Terry “was about ‘reasonableness’ of stops
and frisks under the Reasonableness Clause of the Fourth Amendment, not about the presence
or absence of the probable cause required by its Warrant Clause”). Moreover,
Brennan explained that because street stops and frisks are not police activities that were,
or ever could be, approved by judges in advance—i.e., because a “stop-and-frisk
warrant” is an impossibility—the reasonableness of stops and frisks is not to be judged
by the presence or absence of probable cause. Probable cause is a component of the
Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause, and thus a measure of reasonableness in situations
where police are engaged in warrant-type activity. But probable cause is not relevant,
Brennan wrote, in determining the constitutional reasonableness of police activity that is
not of the warrant type.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Of course, Brennan’s explanation of the relationship between
probable cause and the Warrant Clause is a bit misleading. The Court’s prior precedents that
did not impose a warrant requirement to undertake certain searches or seizures—for example,
warrantless arrests, searches involving exigent circumstances, and car searches—have
nonetheless required probable cause to validate the police intrusion. See, e.g., United States
v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423-24 (1976) (warrantless arrests); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294, 309 (1967) (exigent circumstances). Therefore, the inapplicability of the Warrant Clause
to the facts in Terry did not automatically justify jettisoning the probable cause rule. One
could argue that the Court’s approval of frisks on less than probable cause was inconsistent
with Carroll if one believes that the privacy and dignity of the body merit the same
constitutional protection afforded a vehicle or suitcase.
As the Court applied and expanded Terry, “Justice Marshall came to regret his vote in
Terry.” Barrett, supra note 131, at 827 n.465. While Justice Brennan never explicitly
disavowed his vote or influence on the outcome in Terry, he did articulate the inherent
problem with a reasonableness test for deciding search and seizure cases. See United States
v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 720-21 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court has moved a
step or two further in what appears to be ‘an emerging tendency on the part of the Court to
convert the Terry decision into a general statement that the Fourth Amendment requires only
that any seizure be reasonable’—a balancing process in which the judicial thumb apparently
will be planted firmly on the law enforcement side of the scales.” (citation omitted) (quoting
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 721 (1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring))).
133
SEO, supra note 4, at 155.
131
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policing the public generally and case law on policing cars specifically built on
each other.”134 In sum, Carroll and Terry “were mutually reinforcing.”135 Today,
motorists experience the impact of this combined power. Police routinely stop
motorists on suspicion of a traffic violation or some other offense and arrest the
driver or a passenger after a few questions.136 And it does not matter that the
police are wrong about the law and the motorist committed no traffic violation;
the stop is constitutionally valid (and so is the subsequent arrest). 137 “That an
arrest could begin with suspicion amounted to an astounding expansion of the
police’s power.”138 This is, however, the reality of policing in modern America,
where cars are everywhere and police watch them.
B.

Carroll Leads to Greater Police Authority

Although only two Justices dissented in Carroll, it was a controversial
ruling.139 A few years after it was announced, one legal scholar, “in a devastating

134

Id. at 153.
Id.
136
See generally Tracey Maclin, Police Interrogation During Traffic Stops: More
Questions than Answers, CHAMPION, Nov. 2007, at 34 (discussing common police practices
regarding interrogation during traffic stops).
137
Thus, even when police initiate a traffic stop based on an erroneous view of the traffic
law and the motorist committed no offense, the Court has upheld the stop and later arrest of
the motorist and his passengers. See, e.g., Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 67 (2014)
(holding that reasonable suspicion for traffic stop can rest on mistaken understanding of the
scope of a legal prohibition). There are several problems with Heien, including that “the
principle it endorsed . . . applies to enforcement of laws concerning serious and non-serious
offenses alike,” and “Heien’s reasoning will likely be applied beyond the context of
investigative stops.” Wayne A. Logan, Cutting Cops Too Much Slack, 104 GEO. L.J. ONLINE
89, 92 (2015-2016). Equally troublesome is the combined impact of Heien and Whren v.
United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). As discussed below, Whren authorized pretextual traffic
stops provided the police had probable cause of an actual traffic violation. See infra notes
176-88 and accompanying text.
As bad as Whren was standing in isolation, “there still had to be a violation of law,” an
“actual, real, hard, passes muster with a court, violation of law,” but now with Whren
plus Heien the pretext license has been broadened to instances where the unfortunate
object of police scrutiny has merely come “close to a violation.”
2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT,
§ 3.2(b), at 13 (5th ed. 2012 & Supp. 2018) (quoting Scott H. Greenfield, Heien v. North
Carolina: Close Enough, SIMPLE JUST. (Dec. 16, 2014), https://blog.simplejustice.us
/2014/12/16/heien-v-north-carolina-close-enough/ [https://perma.cc/TGE9-PL95]).
138
SEO, supra note 4, at 154.
139
See, e.g., Black, supra note 116, at 1098 (disapproving, contemporaneously, result in
Carroll); cf. LANDYNSKI, supra note 87, at 87 (stating that Carroll and its early progeny “have
generated powerful judicial controversy”); SEO, supra note 4, at 140 (noting that “[m]uch of
the legal commentary . . . criticized [Carroll] for giving discretionary carte blanche to
prohibition officers,” and that a Mississippi judge denounced Carroll as “erroneous” and
135
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critique,”140 condemned Carroll for, inter alia, permitting “exploratory”
searches and argued that the discretion to search cars afforded by Carroll
“condones a more reprehensible practice than that exercised by British officials
in colonial times.”141 Yet despite its problems, Carroll could be read narrowly
as only allowing warrantless searches of cars when Congress authorized such
searches. In 1948, Justice Jackson’s majority opinion in United States v. Di Re142
did just that: “[T]he Carroll decision falls short of establishing a doctrine that,
without such legislation, automobiles nonetheless are subject to search without
warrant in enforcement of all federal statutes. This Court has never yet said
so.”143 Assuming without deciding that a warrantless search of a car based on
probable cause was constitutional in the absence of congressional approval, Di
Re ruled that the assumed right to search a car did not include the right to search
passengers found inside the car.144
One year later, however, the Court confronted the issue that Carroll and Di
Re left open: Does the Constitution permit a warrantless search of a car in the
absence of congressional authorization? Brinegar v. United States, which
involved a factual scenario that resembled Carroll, gave the Court the chance to
address this question and to determine whether Carroll was correctly decided.145
warned that it “would make petty tyrants of policemen, harass and discommode citizens, and
speedily become intolerable”).
140
LANDYNSKI, supra note 87, at 90.
141
Black, supra note 116, at 1097-98.
142
332 U.S. 581 (1948).
143
Id. at 585.
144
The government argued that the authority to search a car for contraband items includes
the authority to search occupants of the car “because common sense demands that such
[authority] exist in a case such as this where the contraband sought is a small article which
could easily be concealed on the person.” Id. at 586. The Court viewed this position as an
extension of Carroll and ruled that “a person, by mere presence in a suspected car,” does not
“lose[] immunities from search of his person to which he would otherwise be entitled.” Id. at
587.
145
Seo smartly juxtaposes Brinegar with Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled
by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The common view of Wolf is that a unanimous Court
held the Fourth Amendment applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause but rejected the position that the Due Process Clause requires state courts
to exclude evidence that would be inadmissible in federal courts because it was obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Justices “heard argument for the two cases on the
same day in October, and they issued decisions in both cases on the same June day.” S EO,
supra note 4, at 159. According to Seo, “[j]uxtaposing the two cases reveals a jurisprudential
map of how the Court ultimately drew the boundary between arbitrary police power and
lawful discretionary power.” Id. at 160. Pairing the cases demonstrates “that the distinction
between houses and cars mattered when the justices determined what the police could and
could not do.” Id. Put differently, “the constitutional definition of arbitrary policing would
depend on whether or not the police were policing cars.” Id.
Like most judges and scholars, Seo reads Wolf as applying the Fourth Amendment to the
States. See id. at 161 (“In other words, according to Wolf, the due process clause encompassed
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While parked beside a highway, federal officers recognized Virgil Brinegar’s
Ford drive past. One of the agents had arrested Brinegar “about five months
earlier for illegally transporting liquor; had seen [Brinegar] loading liquor into a
car or truck in Joplin, Missouri, on at least two occasions during the preceding
six months,” which was perfectly legal because Missouri was not a “dry” state;
“and knew [Brinegar] to have a reputation for hauling liquor.”146 When
Brinegar’s Ford drove past, the officers observed it to be “‘heavily loaded’ and
‘weighted with something.’”147 After forcing Brinegar’s car off the road, one
officer greeted Brinegar by asking, “Hello, Brinegar, how much liquor have you
got in the car?” Brinegar replied: “Not too much.”148 A search of the Ford
revealed several cases of liquor. After Brinegar was convicted of illegally
transporting into a “dry” state, he appealed to the Court contending that the
police intrusion violated the Fourth Amendment because the officers lacked
probable cause to search his car.
Seo writes that the Justices were “conflicted about how much power the police
had claimed under Carroll’s automobile exception.”149 Initially, the Court voted
five-to-four to affirm the conviction.150 Justice Rutledge agreed that Carroll
controlled the case but told his colleagues that he would overrule it. 151
Eventually, however, Rutledge and Justice Douglas, both considered strong
proponents of civil liberties, changed their votes in favor of the government,
while Justice Jackson, a highly respected conservative jurist, switched his vote
in favor of Brinegar. Seo believes the “flip-flopping votes reflected [the Court’s]
uncertainty” regarding Carroll.152 In the end, Rutledge authored an opinion
finding probable cause under the facts; Jackson dissented.
Despite his strong civil liberties credentials,153 Justice Rutledge “did not even
consider the question of whether the warrantless search of an automobile was
constitutionally reasonable when not authorized by legislation; he simply
the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.”). I disagree. The conventional
understanding of Wolf is not an accurate reading of Wolf. For greater detail, see TRACEY
MACLIN, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S EXCLUSIONARY RULE 44-52,
70-82 (2013).
146
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 162 (1949).
147
Id. at 163.
148
Id.
149
SEO, supra note 4, at 164.
150
Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Black, Burton, Jackson, and Reed voted to affirm.
Justices Douglas, Frankfurter, Murphy, and Rutledge voted to reverse. See Voting Sheet of
Justice Robert Jackson, Brinegar, 338 U.S. 160 (No. 12), Robert H. Jackson Papers, Library
of Congress, Manuscript Division.
151
SEO, supra note 4, at 164.
152
Id.
153
On Rutledge’s commitment to civil liberties while on the Court, see generally JOHN M.
FERREN, SALT OF THE EARTH, CONSCIENCE OF THE COURT: THE STORY OF JUSTICE WILEY
RUTLEDGE (2004). Ferren describes Rutledge’s opinion in Brinegar as “his least felicitous
effort.” Id. at 357.
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assumed that it was.”154 On the other hand, an aspect of Rutledge’s opinion is
remarkably candid. He twice acknowledges that the “troublesome line posed by
the facts in the Carroll case and this case is one between mere suspicion and
probable cause.”155 Nonetheless, Rutledge explains, “That line necessarily must
be drawn by an act of judgment” formed under the totality of the facts. 156 It also
matters that neither case involved searching a “home or any other place of
privacy.”157 Put differently, after admitting that the facts in Carroll and Brinegar
“may have fallen just short of probable cause,”158 Rutledge rules that cases like
Carroll and Brinegar must be resolved “in deference to the officers’ ‘act of
judgment.’ After all, the agents’ suspicions were dead on: Brinegar was, in fact,
transporting illegal liquor. So were the Carroll brothers.”159 Seo rightly describes
this as an “ends-justify-the-means logic.” 160 Equally noteworthy, both Carroll
and Brinegar approve car searches “primarily because of the driver’s past
record, not because of any real evidence that the automobile was being used in
the commission of a crime at the time.”161
By contrast, Justice Jackson’s dissent will long be remembered as “the most
eloquent opinion” he wrote in a Fourth Amendment case.162 Jackson saw
154

LANDYNSKI, supra note 87, at 94; see also Eldon D. Wedlock, Jr., Car 54—How Dare
You!: Toward a Unified Theory of Warrantless Automobile Searches, 75 MARQ. L. REV. 79,
86 (1991) (“[I]n Brinegar v. United States, the statutory limits of the Carroll rule were
surpassed for the first time.” (footnote omitted)). Justice Rutledge cites Carroll for the legal
norm that warrantless searches of cars are constitutionally reasonable when based on probable
cause. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 164 (1949) (“The Carroll decision held
that, under the Fourth Amendment, a valid search of a vehicle moving on a public highway
may be had without a warrant, but only if probable cause for the search exists.”).
155
Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 176. A page later, he writes: “The question presented in the
Carroll case lay on the border between suspicion and probable cause.” Id. at 177.
156
Id. at 176.
157
Id.
158
SEO, supra note 4, at 166. Justice Burton went even further in his willingness to uphold
the stop and search. He argued that police officers “are commissioned to represent the interests
of the public in the enforcement of the law and this requires affirmative action not only when
there is reasonable ground for an arrest or probable cause for a search but when there is
reasonable ground for an investigation.” Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 179 (Burton, J., concurring).
In other words, Burton was willing to permit seizures and searches of vehicles on less than
probable cause. See id.
159
SEO, supra note 4, at 166.
160
Id. She adds:
[F]or the majorities in both Carroll and Brinegar, the exigencies of crime control took
priority. Their deference to law enforcement indicated that the public’s interest in a
crime-free, and alcohol-free, community far outweighed a vigorous review of the
police’s actions when they investigated cars. It is hard to overstate the implications of
the Brinegar decision.
Id. at 167.
161
LANDYNSKI, supra note 87, at 96.
162
Id. at 95.
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Rutledge’s opinion as an “extension” of Carroll, which he thought “already
ha[d] been too much taken by enforcement officers as blanket authority to stop
and search cars on suspicion.”163 Unlike Rutledge, Jackson did not let Brinegar’s
guilt sway his understanding of the Fourth Amendment. Despite this, Seo notes
that “[o]ne takeaway from [Brinegar] was that actions that skirted the boundary
of illegality might not count as arbitrary if the police got the right person.”164
While perhaps susceptible to this view—“[a]fter all, [Jackson] had initially
voted to affirm [Brinegar’s] conviction”165—in the end, Jackson came to a
different conclusion. For Jackson, freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures was just as important as freedom of speech and religion. 166 Because the
judiciary was best positioned to protect Fourth Amendment freedoms, Jackson
believed that it was incumbent to see that “a search against Brinegar’s car must
be regarded as a search of the car of Everyman.” 167 In other words, while
Brinegar “was guilty, he represented every innocent person who had been pulled
over and searched without lawful reason.”168
C.

From Arbitrary Policing to Discriminatory Policing

By the midpoint of the twentieth century, arbitrary policing was alive and
well.169 Of course, during this time, discriminatory policing was also pervasive,
if not more prevalent.170 “Still, most jurists understood arbitrary and
discriminatory policing as distinct concepts: arbitrariness selected its victims at
random, whereas discrimination targeted specific groups.” 171 Justice Jackson’s
dissent in Brinegar focused on the former; he believed that Carroll and Brinegar
afforded police too much discretion to stop and search innocent motorists.
Nearly fifty years later, however, “the problem of arbitrary policing had
narrowed to discriminatory policing.”172 And by the end of the twentieth

163

Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 183 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
SEO, supra note 4, at 168.
165
Id.
166
Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 180 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (noting that Fourth Amendment
freedoms “are not mere second-class rights but belong in the catalog of indispensable
freedoms”).
167
Id. at 181.
168
SEO, supra note 4, at 169. She adds: “The idea of Everyman suggested that implicit in
the definition of arbitrariness was a distinction between the guilty and the innocent. In other
words, to become a problem of arbitrary policing, it had to affect the law-abiding.” Id.
169
Id. at 156-58, 171-82 (detailing examples of alleged arbitrary and random stops of
motorists, including “secret roadblocks” in Los Angeles).
170
Cf., e.g., id. at 169 (“To be sure, midcentury Americans recognized, to varying degrees,
that the police picked on racial minorities. Organizations such as the NAACP were calling
attention to police lawlessness against black citizens.”); id. at 183-90 (detailing examples
police of abuse, violence, and killings of black motorists from 1930s to 1950s).
171
Id. at 169.
172
Id. at 262.
164
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century, police learned to use the law to their advantage. For example, “police
have raised traffic stops to an art form.”173 Police employ the traffic code and
regulations governing vehicle equipment and condition “as a pretext to stop
drivers they want to question and even to search them.”174 Of course, these stops
are not about enforcing the traffic law but instead are “fishing expeditions” for
criminal conduct. Seo nicely describes the evolution of the law of policing
automobiles:
At midcentury, the problem was the potential for police action without
basis in law, so Everyman needed the exclusionary rule to deter unlawful
policing. At century’s end, the problem had become police action that did
have a basis in law but that departed from normal practice. Put simply,
police treated minorities differently. 175
In 1996, Whren v. United States176 presented the Court the opportunity to
address this problem. The defendants in Whren argued that using a traffic stop
as a pretext to conduct an investigation for other crime violated the Fourth
Amendment.177 The Court, not surprisingly, disagreed. A unanimous Court held
that a traffic stop based on probable cause is constitutionally permissible
regardless of police motive—even motive based on racial stereotypes or bias—
because the subjective intent of the police is irrelevant. “[T]he Fourth
Amendment’s concern with ‘reasonableness’ allows certain actions to be taken
in certain circumstances, whatever the subjective intent”178 of law enforcement.
Whren is not only “notorious for its effective legitimation of racial profiling
in the United States.”179 It is a constitutional disgrace.180 Rather than rehash
173

DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING CANNOT WORK 30
(2002); see Gary Webb, DWB, ESQUIRE, Apr. 1999, at 118 (describing federal Operation
Pipeline program, which teaches state and local police how to use traffic stops for drug
interdiction purposes); id. at 125 (describing one police instructor’s view: “‘If they [drivers]
refuse [a police request to search the car], the stuff’s in the trunk,’ our [California Highway
Patrol] instructor tells us matter-of-factly. A refusal justifies calling out the dogs and letting a
drug-sniffing canine take a walk around your car. . . . Most drivers consent.”).
174
HARRIS, supra note 173, at 30.
175
SEO, supra note 4, at 262.
176
517 U.S. 806 (1996).
177
Id. at 810.
178
Id. at 814.
179
Chin & Vernon, supra note 44, at 884.
180
Criticism of Whren is vast and cogent. See 1 LAFAVE, supra note 13, § 1.4(f), at 176
n.86 (citing articles criticizing Whren). The adverse effect Whren has on black motorists was
demonstrated when, in order to protect the Fourth Amendment rights of blacks living in
Ferguson, Missouri, the federal government required that Ferguson police officers refrain
from exercising police authority—pretextual traffic stops—that a unanimous Supreme Court
had ruled was constitutional. See Consent Decree at 20, United States v. City of Ferguson,
No. 4:16-cv-00180 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 17, 2016) (“[Ferguson Police Department] officers will
not conduct pretextual stops except where the actual reason for the stop is to investigate a
felony.”).
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Whren’s many flaws, I will highlight Seo’s contribution to understanding how
Whren fits within the history of policing cars. One argument that the Whren
defendants proferred was that police department policy barred the plainclothes
officers from making routine traffic stops. Essentially, the defendants contended
that a traffic stop cannot be constitutionally reasonable when officers violate
their own departmental rules. The Court responded that this argument—to
equate violation of departmental rules with constitutional wrongs—would make
the traffic code “a dead letter at the option of the police department.” 181
The Court’s rejection of this claim, as Seo explains, “did not consider how
police departments did effectively repeal traffic laws when they issued a policy
or adopted a general practice of non-enforcement.” 182 Moreover, Whren ignored
“how selective enforcement was unavoidable because the laws as well as their
violations were so numerous.”183 Ultimately, Whren’s approval of pretextual
stops and the inevitable racial profiling that encourages such stops directly
follows from Carroll and Brinegar. In 1925, Carroll demonstrated that the Court
would not closely scrutinize police decisions to stop and search bootleggers. The
Court’s ruling licensed lower courts to do the same. Nearly twenty-five years
later, when confronted with the “ditch[ing]”184 and search of an automobile
based on facts that straddled the line “between mere suspicion and probable
cause”185 and knowing that law enforcement perceived Carroll “as blanket
authority to stop and search cars on suspicion,”186 Brinegar explained that the
Court would defer to an “act of judgment” by police.187 In light of this history,
no one should be surprised that Whren, employing the same “reasonableness”
model embraced by Carroll and Brinegar, would allow racial profiling via
traffic stops to proceed unabated by Fourth Amendment rules.
Seo writes that search and seizure doctrine “had not evolved over the
twentieth century to deal with lawful, but racially motivated, policing. It
developed to allow ‘reasonable’ investigations during vehicle stops. But by
enabling discretionary policing, the Fourth Amendment had also created
opportunities for racial profiling.”188

181
Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Whren, 517 U.S. 806 (No. 95-5841), 1996 WL
195296, at *8. Seo helpfully notes that during oral argument, one Justice remarked: “[T]he
police don’t have the authority to tell the legislature which traffic laws are to be repealed.”
SEO, supra note 4, at 263 (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument, supra, at 8).
182
SEO, supra note 4, at 263.
183
Id. at 263. Due to the ubiquitous nature of traffic and vehicular rules, “no driver can go
for even a short drive without violating some aspect of the traffic code. And since there are
no perfect drivers, everyone’s a violator.” HARRIS, supra note 173, at 31.
184
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 187 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
185
Id. at 176 (majority opinion).
186
Id. at 183 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
187
Id. at 176 (majority opinion).
188
SEO, supra note 4, at 264.
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This description insinuates that “the Fourth Amendment” is responsible for
the race-based traffic stops that exist today. Seo is being politic. The Fourth
Amendment did not create Carroll, Brinegar, and Whren; the Justices of the
Supreme Court did. They are the ones to credit (or blame) for the degree of
discretion police can employ and the minimal constitutional liberty motorists
possess.
II. FROM BAD TO WORSE:
SEARCHING CARS TO SEARCHING CONTAINERS IN CARS
Some scholars and judges may scoff at the claim that Carroll is responsible
for the racial profiling that currently occurs on America’s roads. Professor Seo’s
research and analysis, however, persuades me that the discretionary authority
that Carroll gave police was a harbinger of what was to come and that Whren is
simply another manifestation of the power granted in Carroll. The results in
Carroll and Whren are based on a “reasonableness” theory of the Fourth
Amendment that affords police wide discretion to stop or search vehicles. To be
sure, Carroll’s holding could have been cabined if the Justices were willing to
do so. Justice Jackson, for one, tried to restrain the scope of Carroll. And it
would not have required much judicial ingenuity to limit the police authority
afforded by Carroll (and its extension in Brinegar).
There are sound and neutral principles to justify why police, in most
circumstances, should have to obtain warrants before searching vehicles. From
a textualist perspective, a person’s vehicle is “one of his ‘effects’ and hence
within the express protection of the Fourth Amendment.”189 As Justice Scalia
noted in a different context, “The text of the Fourth Amendment reflects its close
connection to property,”190 and no one disputes that vehicles, despite being
subject to pervasive governmental regulation, are property of their owners.
Accordingly, because there is no doubt that the amendment protects effects as
well as persons, homes, and papers, and because the Warrant Clause does not
differentiate “between searches conducted in private homes and other
searches,”191 the burden should fall to the government to show why a warrantless
vehicle search was necessary under the specific facts of a case.
Furthermore, if the Constitution does not permit warrantless searches of, say,
suitcases, footlockers, packages placed in the mail, or other effects seized by the
police, notwithstanding probable cause that those effects harbor evidence of
criminality, it is not self-evident why a similar rule should not apply to vehicles
under the control of the police. “If moveable property outside automobiles
generally can be detained while a warrant is sought and searched only after such

189
190
191

Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 182 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012).
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 8 (1977).
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warrant has been obtained (absent exigent circumstances), the same rule should
apply to automobiles.”192
Indeed, there was a time when several of the Justices (but never five or more
in a single opinion) appreciated that cars should be treated like other effects for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Ironically, it was Justice Harlan, “The Great
Dissenter of the Warren Court,”193 in a car case at the start of the Burger Court,
who recognized this parallel logic194 and scolded his colleagues for “shunting
aside th[e] vital Fourth Amendment safeguard” that is the warrant requirement
in a scenario where the police could have easily obtained a warrant to authorize
searching a car.195 One year later, Coolidge v. New Hampshire,196 held a search
of an automobile unconstitutional when the facts gave police ample time and

192

Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Fourth Amendment: Internal Revenue Code or Body of
Principles?, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 956, 976 (2006).
193
See TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN: GREAT DISSENTER OF THE
WARREN COURT 249 (1992) (discussing letter from friend of Justice Harlan labeling him “the
Great Dissenter”).
194
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 64 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“The Court’s endorsement of a warrantless invasion of [automobile]
privacy where another course would suffice is simply inconsistent with our repeated stress on
the Fourth Amendment’s mandate of ‘adherence to judicial process.’” (citing, for example,
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967))); id. at 61 (“The Court has long read the Fourth
Amendment’s proscription of ‘unreasonable’ searches as imposing a general principle that a
search without a warrant is not justified by the mere knowledge by the searching officers of
facts showing probable cause. . . . Fidelity to this established principle requires that, where
exceptions are made to accommodate the exigencies of particular situations, those exceptions
be no broader than necessitated by the circumstances presented.”).
195
Id. at 64 n.9. In Chambers, the occupants of a vehicle were arrested for an armed
robbery. The vehicle was seized and taken to a police station, where it was searched. Evidence
from the search was admitted at trial. The Court upheld the search, though conceding that
“because of the preference for a magistrate’s judgment, only the immobilization of the car
should be permitted until a search warrant is obtained; arguably, only the ‘lesser’ intrusion is
permissible until the magistrate authorizes the ‘greater.’” Id. at 51 (majority opinion).
Notwithstanding this logic, which at the time was the constitutional rule for searching
packages placed in the mail, see United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 253 (1970),
Chambers found, for Fourth Amendment purposes, no difference between “on the one hand
seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on
the other hand carrying out an immediate search without a warrant.” Chambers, 399 U.S. at
52. Following the “reasonableness” theory of Carroll, the Court concluded that “[g]iven
probable cause to search, either course is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Id.
Justice Harlan’s opinion noted, inter alia, that this conclusion was inconsistent with the
Court’s previous “insistence in other areas that departures from the warrant requirement
strictly conform to the exigency presented.” Id. at 63 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
196
403 U.S. 443 (1971).
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means to obtain a warrant.197 In explaining this result, Coolidge famously stated
that the “word ‘automobile’ is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth
Amendment fades away and disappears.”198 Indeed, Coolidge adopted a
measured and traditional view of Carroll: “Carroll, on its face, appears to be a
classic example of the doctrine that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable
in the absence of exigent circumstances. Every word in the opinion indicates the
Court’s adherence to the underlying rule and its care in delineating a limited
exception.”199 Of course, today’s Justices have not embraced Coolidge’s
approach to cars and warrants.200 But to comprehend Fourth Amendment history
and doctrine, one should know that Justice Harlan and the Coolidge plurality
offered an alternative vision for applying the Fourth Amendment to cars.
While fidelity to Fourth Amendment norms would favor the approaches urged
by Justice Harlan and Coolidge, one must concede that there is a neutral
principle for treating cars differently from other effects. If Chambers had
announced a contrary rule,
it would have imposed a constitutional requirement upon police
departments of all sizes around the country to have available the people
and equipment necessary to transport impounded automobiles to some
197
Id. at 460 (plurality opinion) (noting that “police had known for some time of the
probable role of the Pontiac car in the crime,” and thus failure to obtain warrant was
unjustified). Justice Stewart’s opinion cited several factors why the warrantless search was
unreasonable: the police had known for some time the car’s involvement in the murder; the
defendant knew he was a suspect, but “there was no indication that he meant to flee”; on the
night the car was seized, it was not being used “for any illegal purpose” and was regularly
parked in the driveway of the defendant’s home; the objects the police sought from the car
“were neither stolen nor contraband nor dangerous”; and finally, after the defendant was
arrested in his home, there was no way he could have accessed the vehicle, and his “premises
were guarded throughout the night by two policemen.” Id. at 460-61. For good measure,
Justice Stewart remarked that if the logic of Carroll permits a search of a car under these
conditions, “then it would permit as well a warrantless search of a suitcase or a box.” Id. at
461 n.18. But Stewart noted that no precedent “suggests such an extension of Carroll.” Id.
198
Id. at 461-62 (opinion of the court). In light of his separate opinion in Chambers, it is
not evident why Justice Harlan did not join this portion of Justice Stewart’s opinion.
Regarding Chambers’s holding, Justice Stewart conceded that there was no exigency
justifying the warrantless search there. Id. at 463 n.20 (noting that a magistrate was “easily
available” and any exigent circumstances had passed). Nonetheless, he explained that the
“rationale of Chambers is that given a justified initial intrusion, there is little difference
between a search on the open highway and a later search at the station.” Id. By contrast,
Coolidge concerned “the prior question of whether the initial intrusion is justified.” Id. For
Stewart, there was an obvious difference between seizing and searching a car on the open
highway and entering private property to seize and search a vehicle “not then being used for
any illegal purpose.” Id.
199
Id. at 479.
200
It bears noting that Coolidge’s ruling has never been formally disavowed. That said,
the results in Maryland v. Dyson and Pennsylvania v. Labron have effectively made Coolidge
a dead letter. See supra note 87.
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central location until warrants could be secured. Moreover, once seized
automobiles were taken from the highway the police would be responsible
for providing some appropriate location where they could be kept, with due
regard to the safety of the vehicles and their contents, until a magistrate
ruled on the application for a warrant. Such a constitutional requirement
therefore would have imposed severe, even impossible, burdens on many
police departments. No comparable burdens are likely to exist with respect
to the seizure of personal luggage.201
This position, of course, is not mandated by constitutional text but instead
reflects federalism values.202 In essence, the financial costs that states would
incur if Carroll’s admonition about obtaining warrants had been taken seriously
would be too much.
Whatever one thinks about the merits of this conclusion, these costs concerns
are irrelevant when deciding the authority of police to search containers and
other effects found in cars. The Justices have not disagreed. Yet the Court has
ruled repeatedly that warrantless searches of containers discovered in cars are
permissible based on probable cause.203 Seo, again, traces this development to
Carroll:
By century’s end, the logic of Carroll had reached its fullest potential.
[Rulings from the 1980s to the 1990s] established brighter-line rules that
gave the police a great deal of discretionary authority. The inevitability of
case-by-case adjudication under the standard of reasonableness also
favored the police, especially when evidence of guilt could slant the ex post
facto narrative told in court.204
201
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 765 n.14 (1979) (citation omitted), abrogated by
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
202
The Court took a similar approach in County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44
(1991), when it rejected an arrestee’s claim that he should have been afforded a judicial
determination of probable cause within twenty-four hours of his arrest. Id. at 58 (deeming
forty-eight-hour window to determine probable cause constitutional). The Court explained
that states should have the flexibility to combine a probable cause hearing with other pretrial
proceedings, thus elevating federalism concerns over an individual’s interest in obtaining a
prompt judicial determination of probable cause for his arrest. Id. at 53-54.
203
See, e.g., Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 307 (1999) (“We hold that police
officers with probable cause to search a car may inspect passengers’ belongings found in the
car that are capable of concealing the object of the search.”); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S.
562, 580 (1991) (holding that police may search containers in vehicles when they have
probable cause to believe it contains contraband or evidence); United States v. Johns, 469
U.S. 478, 488 (1985) (holding search of packages taken from a vehicle—three days after being
placed in warehouse—to be reasonable because government “was entitled to seize the
packages and could have searched them immediately without a warrant”); United States v.
Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 800 (1982) (holding that police stopping vehicle with probable cause
“may conduct a search of the vehicle that is as thorough as a magistrate could authorize in a
warrant”).
204
SEO, supra note 4, at 254.
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Ultimately, Seo explains that the Justices extended Carroll’s logic to the very
different issue of a warrantless search of a container found within a car because
motorists had “a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle.”205 Seo is again
being diplomatic in her characterization of the Court’s reasoning. Nobody—
including the Justices—sincerely believes that motorists have diminished
privacy interests in purses, wallets, and suitcases placed in cars. As the
remainder of this Part explains, what propelled the results in these cases were
fictional claims regarding motorists’ privacy in their effects, intellectually
dishonest reasoning, and an effort to make car searches easier.206
A.

Fictional View of Motorists’ Privacy

Generally speaking, the notion that motorists possess a lesser expectation of
privacy in their vehicles has not withstood scrutiny. 207 Extending this belief to

205

Id.
The important cases are Acevedo, Chadwick, Ross, and Sanders. Professor LaFave
expertly describes and critiques these cases and all of the Court’s other vehicle search cases.
3 LAFAVE, supra note 13, § 7.2, at 721-90.
207
Justice Blackmun was an early proponent of the view that motorists have “a lesser
expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation and it seldom
serves as one’s residence or as the repository of personal effects.” Cardwell v. Lewis, 417
U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (opinion of Blackmun, J.). Blackmun’s assertions were particularly
reckless because Lewis addressed whether paint scrapings from the exterior of an automobile
and an observation of the tread of a tire was unreasonable without a warrant. Id. at 589. Rather
than confine his remarks about motorists’ privacy to the facts, however, Blackmun’s view of
motorists’ privacy was stated in general terms to include the interior of the car and containers
therein. Professor Lewis Katz has nicely summarized why this view is, at best, a legal fiction:
[T]he driver or occupant of a vehicle who places objects under the seat, in a locked or
unlocked glove compartment, or in a trunk does not surrender his expectation of privacy
in those items. Although Katz [v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967),] recognized that
one surrenders his privacy in that which he places in public view, Katz and Chadwick
specifically recognize that an individual may protect his privacy by taking precautions.
That is exactly what the occupant of an automobile does when he places items out of
sight, whether or not in closed compartments.
[A]lthough the automobile is primarily used for transportation, it can also be used as a
repository for personal effects. There are probably few Americans who have not at one
time or another used their cars for storage, albeit unwisely. All personal effects so stored
are entitled to fourth amendment protection; constitutional guarantees are not reserved
only for valuable possessions carefully protected by their owners. Most Americans view
the automobile as more than merely a means of transportation.
Finally, the high degree of government regulation does not support the excessive
diminution of fourth amendment protection of the automobile which accompanies
application of the automobile exception. A legitimate interest in securing compliance
with safety and traffic regulations should not be used to justify a reduced expectation of
privacy in the entire vehicle.
Lewis R. Katz, Automobile Searches and Diminished Expectations in the Warrant Clause, 19
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 557, 570-72 (1982) (footnotes omitted).
206
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containers discovered inside of a car makes no sense if a court intends to protect
privacy interests. If a briefcase, purse, or a two-hundred-pound footlocker
carried by a pedestrian cannot be subjected to a warrantless search
notwithstanding probable cause that it contains evidence of criminality, a
warrantless search should not be permitted the moment the pedestrian puts his
or her effect in a car and becomes a motorist. The Court, however, has decided
otherwise.
For example, Wyoming v. Houghton208 addressed whether police can search a
passenger’s purse found inside a car when they have probable cause to search
the car for drugs but lack particularized cause that the purse contains drugs.
Speaking for a majority, Justice Scalia announced a per se rule that where there
is probable cause to search for contraband inside a car, it is reasonable for the
police to examine passengers’ packages and containers without a showing of
individualized probable cause for each one. Justifying this result under a
“balancing” analysis,209 Scalia asserts that passengers, like drivers, have a
reduced expectation of privacy with regard to property transported in cars.
Specifically, he states that cars “seldom serv[e] as . . . the repository of personal
effects, are subjected to police stop and examination to enforce ‘pervasive’
governmental controls ‘[a]s an everyday occurrence,’ and, finally, are exposed
to traffic accidents that may render all their contents open to public scrutiny.” 210
Who believes this? People routinely place property and effects—such as
wallets, purses, knapsacks, and envelopes—in cars fully expecting that those
Indeed, the Court itself has, on occasion, acknowledged that motorists expect and deserve
Fourth Amendment protection while on the road. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798,
823 (1982) (“Certainly the privacy interests in a car’s trunk or glove compartment may be no
less than those in a movable container. An individual undoubtedly has a significant interest
that the upholstery of his automobile will not be ripped or a hidden compartment within it
opened.”); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764 (1979) (“[A] suitcase taken from an
automobile stopped on the highway is not necessarily attended by any lesser expectation of
privacy than is associated with luggage taken from other locations. One is not less inclined to
place private, personal possessions in a suitcase merely because the suitcase is to be carried
in an automobile rather than transported by other means or temporarily checked or stored.
Indeed, the very purpose of a suitcase is to serve as a repository for personal items when one
wishes to transport them.”), abrogated by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991); cf.
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662 (1979) (“Automobile travel is a basic, pervasive, and
often necessary mode of transportation to and from one’s home, workplace, and leisure
activities. Many people spend more hours each day traveling in cars than walking on the
streets. Undoubtedly, many find a greater sense of security and privacy in traveling in an
automobile than they do in exposing themselves by pedestrian or other modes of travel.”).
208
526 U.S. 295 (1999).
209
At the start of his analysis section, Scalia read “the historical evidence to show that the
Framers would have regarded as reasonable (if there was probable cause) the warrantless
search of containers within an automobile.” Id. at 300.
210
Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303 (1999) (alteration in original) (citations
omitted) (first quoting Cardwell, 417 U.S. at 590 (opinion of Blackmun, J.); and then quoting
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976)).
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items will remain private. Purses and knapsacks often contain a passenger’s (and
driver’s) most intimate and private items, and there is no everyday type of
regulation of vehicular traffic that calls for routine inspection of a passenger’s
purse or knapsack.211 Equally unconvincing is Scalia’s final reason for a reduced
privacy interest—containers in cars are “exposed to traffic accidents” that reveal
their contents to public viewing. As Professor LaFave notes, this is another
“invented” justification.212 In my view, it has no basis in the real world.
B.

Intentionally Misleading Reasoning

Professor Seo briefly mentions California v. Acevedo213 and describes it as
one of a series of bright-line rules meant to give police “a great deal of
discretionary authority.”214 For me, Acevedo is the exemplar of the modern
Court’s intellectually dishonest reasoning in car cases. Examining the
government’s argument in United States v. Chadwick215 and Justice Blackmun’s
dissent in Chadwick is essential to understand the degree of Acevedo’s
misleading reasoning. As described below, although Blackmun dissented in
Chadwick, he wrote for a majority of the Court in Acevedo.
In Chadwick, federal officers in Boston had probable cause that a twohundred-pound footlocker that had just arrived on a train contained marijuana.
The officers watched the suspects load the footlocker into the trunk of
Chadwick’s car, which was waiting outside South Station. While “the trunk of
the car was still open and before the car engine had been started,” all of the
suspects were arrested.216 The officers then took the footlocker to the Federal
Building in Boston and, an hour and a half after the arrests, opened the footlocker
and found marijuana.
At the Supreme Court, the Solicitor General argued that the Warrant Clause
protects only interests traditionally identified with the home. 217 The government
contended that the Warrant Clause was adopted mainly to counter unjustified
intrusions into private homes on the authority of general warrants and writs of
assistance.218 Relying on this history, the government submitted that only
homes, offices, and private communications implicate interests that lie at the
211
See 3 LAFAVE, supra note 13, § 7.2(d), at 782 (critiquing Houghton and noting that it
is “more accurate” to say purses and knapsacks rarely contain items other than personal effects
and there is no regulation requiring passengers “to open the containers they have with them”).
212
Id.
213
500 U.S. 565 (1991).
214
SEO, supra note 4, at 254.
215
433 U.S. 1 (1977).
216
Id. at 4.
217
Brief for the United States at 16, Chadwick, 433 U.S. 24 (No. 75-1721), 1977 WL
189820, at *16 (noting that Court had never presumptively required a warrant “in a context
other than a search of the home”).
218
Id. at 23 (arguing that Fourth Amendment was adopted “against background of a
history of lawless entry into a man’s home under the guise of authority”).
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core of the Fourth Amendment.219 In all other contexts, the government insisted
that less significant privacy interests are at stake and that the reasonableness of
a challenged search should turn on whether probable cause exists. 220 As a
fallback position, the government argued that the reasoning of the automobile
cases demonstrates the reasonableness of allowing warrantless searches of
luggage, including the footlocker.221 In the government’s view, luggage was
analogous to cars for Fourth Amendment purposes.222
The Chadwick majority rejected both of the Solicitor General’s arguments.
Chief Justice Burger, a law-and-order conservative,223 wrote the majority
opinion concluding that the warrantless search violated the Fourth Amendment.
Regarding the government’s claim that luggage was analogous to cars, the Chief
Justice explained that the automobile exception was based “in part on [an
automobile’s] inherent mobility, which often makes obtaining a judicial warrant
impracticable,” and the “diminished expectation of privacy which surrounds the
automobile.”224 Justice Blackmun—who, unlike Burger, was the darling of the
219
Id. at 12 (arguing that such an intrusion so impinges on privacy as to be considered per
se unreasonable in only those very limited circumstances).
220
Id. at 44 (noting that probable cause should be key consideration of Court in
determining constitutionality of search).
221
Id. at 45-46 (“We submit that no different result is required because the agents searched
a footlocker rather than a vehicle.”).
222
As noted in Chadwick, the government did not argue that the footlocker’s brief time in
the trunk of the car “makes this an automobile search” case and thus justifies the warrantless
search under the Carroll-Chambers exception. See Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 11.
223
See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & LINDA GREENHOUSE, THE BURGER COURT AND THE
RISE OF THE JUDICIAL RIGHT 7 (2016) (explaining that, unlike other Justices appointed by
Republican Presidents, Chief Justice Burger “never” moved leftward in his voting patterns
and that Burger and William Rehnquist “were the two most reliably conservative justices of
the Burger Court”); EARL M. MALTZ, THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF WARREN BURGER 1969-1986,
at 9 (2000) (noting that as member of U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, “Burger became a leading voice for conservative positions on a generally liberal
court—particularly on matters relating to criminal procedure”).
224
In contrast to cars, Chief Justice Burger explained that the contents of luggage are not
open to public view or subject to regular inspection, and thus luggage is intended as a
repository of personal effects. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 13. The mobility of the footlocker did
not justify a warrantless search because once officers had seized and immobilized it, “it was
unreasonable to undertake the additional and greater intrusion of a search without a warrant.”
Id. Two years later, the Court granted certiorari in Sanders to clarify “whether [Chadwick]
applied to a piece of luggage in a moving automobile stopped on probable cause.” Arkansas
v. Sanders, Supreme Court Case Files Collection, Box 59, Powell Papers, Lewis F. Powell Jr.
Archives, Washington & Lee University School of Law, Virginia (letter to Chief Justice
Burger, dated May 11, 1979).
Sanders was a close replay of the facts in Chadwick. Police had probable cause that
Sanders’s green suitcase contained marijuana. Police watched as Sanders arrived at an airport,
met a companion, retrieved the green suitcase from the baggage service, got in a taxi while
the companion placed the suitcase in the trunk of the taxi, and joined Sanders in the taxi. After

2019]

COPS AND CARS

2357

liberals when he retired225—however, dissented in Chadwick. Although he did
not adopt all of the government’s arguments, Blackmun did accept the
government’s claim that the Warrant Clause was inapplicable here; he believed
that “a warrant is not required to seize and search any movable property in the
possession of a person properly arrested in a public place.”226 Blackmun
conceded that merely seizing the footlocker and awaiting a magistrate’s
authorization for a search would have been a less intrusive alternative. However,
the mere fact that a warrant could have been obtained did not make the
warrantless search unreasonable. Why not? According to Blackmun, “[A]
warrant would be routinely forthcoming in the vast majority of situations where
the property has been seized in conjunction with the valid arrest of a person in a
public place.”227 Therefore, requiring police to obtain a warrant “would [not]
have much practical effect in protecting Fourth Amendment values.” 228
Though he dissented in Chadwick and Arkansas v. Sanders,229 Justice
Blackmun wrote for a majority in Acevedo. At stake was whether police must
obtain a warrant to search a closed container found in a vehicle simply because
they lack probable cause to search the entire car.230 Nine years earlier, United
States v. Ross231 left this issue undecided.232 The facts in Acevedo mirrored the
the taxi left the airport, police stopped it and took the suitcase from the trunk and opened it.
Inside was marijuana. The Court ruled the search unconstitutional and held that “the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment applies to personal luggage taken from an automobile
to the same degree it applies to such luggage in other locations.” Arkansas v. Sanders, 442
U.S. 753, 766 (1979), abrogated by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991). Put simply,
Sanders ruled that the automobile exception did not authorize police to search personal
luggage.
225
See, e.g., Ruth Marcus, Justice Blackmun Announces Retirement, WASH. POST, Apr. 7,
1994, at A1 (describing Justice Blackmun as a “passionate liberal voice”); Retired Justice
Blackmun Sees a Blight of Increasing Racism, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1995, at A14 (describing
Justice Blackmun as Court’s “leading liberal”).
226
Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). This was the same position
Blackmun took dissenting in Sanders. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 769 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(“The luggage, like the automobile transporting it, is mobile. And the expectation of privacy
in a suitcase found in the car is probably not significantly greater than the expectation of
privacy in a locked glove compartment or trunk.”).
227
Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 20 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
228
Id.
229
442 U.S. 753 (1979), abrogated by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
230
Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 573.
231
456 U.S. 798 (1982).
232
Ross addressed “the extent to which police officers—who have legitimately stopped an
automobile and who have probable cause to believe that contraband is concealed somewhere
within it—may conduct a probing search of compartments and containers within the vehicle
whose contents are not in plain view.” Id. at 800. The Court, speaking through Justice Stevens,
held that police “may conduct a search of the vehicle that is as thorough as a magistrate could
authorize in a warrant ‘particularly describing the place to be searched.’” Id. (quoting U.S.
CONST. amend. IV). While Ross cast doubt on some of Sanders’s reasoning, it did not disturb
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facts in Sanders.233 Police observed Acevedo place a brown paper bag in the
trunk of his car and drive away. Police had probable cause that the bag contained
marijuana. Police stopped the car, searched the bag, and found marijuana. A
California appellate court correctly ruled that Sanders and Ross controlled.
Justice Blackmun, however, reasoned that the dichotomy created in Ross,
which allows a warrantless search of a container discovered during the course
of a general search of a car but disallows the same search where there is only
probable cause to search the container, is logically unsound.234 According to
Blackmun—and this is where the misleading reasoning starts—separate rules
for containers “may enable the police to broaden their power to make warrantless
searches and disserve privacy interests.”235 How does the Ross dual-track rule
undermine motorists’ privacy interests? “If the police know that they may open
a bag only if they are actually searching the entire car, they may search more
extensively than they otherwise would in order to establish the general probable
cause required by Ross.”236
Blackmun’s reasoning for abandoning Ross’s dual-track rule would be
amusing if it were not found in the United States Reports. Police need probable
cause before they begin a search. As any diligent law student in a criminal
procedure class knows, an otherwise illegal search cannot be justified in order
to validate a lesser intrusion. Thus, just as a search cannot be validated by what

Sanders’s holding. Id. at 824 (noting that decision is consistent “with the portion of the
opinion in Arkansas v. Sanders on which the plurality in Robbins [v. California, 453 U.S. 420
(1981),] relied”). As Professor LaFave notes, “This meant that if there was only probable
cause to search a particular container in the vehicle but not probable cause to search the
vehicle generally, Ross did not control and a warrant was required to search the container, but
not to seize it.” 3 LAFAVE, supra note 13, § 7.2(d), at 769 (footnote omitted).
233
Justice Blackmun misleadingly writes that the facts in Acevedo “closely resemble the
facts in Ross.” Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 572. In Ross, police had probable cause that Ross was
selling drugs “kept in the trunk of a car.” Ross, 456 U.S. at 800. By contrast, in both Sanders
and Acevedo police had probable cause that a particular container in the car contained drugs.
In both cases, there was no probable cause that other parts of the vehicle contained drugs.
234
Justice Blackmun acknowledged that closed containers seized by the police, whether
“found after a general search of the automobile . . . [or] found in a car after a limited search
for the container[,] are equally easy for the police to store and for the suspect to hide or
destroy.” Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 574. And he also recognized that no reason exists to distinguish
the privacy expectations of containers based on whether the police had probable cause to
search the entire vehicle or only probable cause to search a specific container. Id.
235
Id.
236
Id. at 574-75.
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it reveals,237 so too the police are not free to conduct an extensive search in order
to demonstrate legal grounds for a lesser intrusion.238
Justice Blackmun offers another reasoning for abandoning the dual-track rule.
He asserts that the dichotomy created in Ross provided only minimal protection
of privacy interests because once police officers obtain probable cause to seize
property, “a warrant will be routinely forthcoming in the overwhelming majority
of cases.”239 What is wrong with this argument? For starters, the government
made the same argument in Chadwick and lost. Indeed, Blackmun’s statement
has never been the law. The Court stated long ago that warrantless searches are
unconstitutional “notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing probable
cause.”240 Despite this well-established norm, Acevedo ruled that the Fourth
Amendment does not compel a warrant for a car search that extends only to a
closed container found inside a car, thus expressly overruling Sanders.241
To be sure, Acevedo does not permit willy-nilly searches of cars whenever
police have probable cause. It reaffirmed Ross’s admonition that “[p]robable
cause to believe that a container placed in the trunk of a taxi contains contraband
or evidence does not justify a search of the entire cab.”242 But Blackmun’s
holding is a gift to the police because it makes searching containers found in cars
easier. Although he asserts otherwise,243 Blackmun’s ruling in Acevedo is an
extension of Carroll. In Sanders, the Arkansas Attorney General contended that
237

This is a long-standing principle. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 16-17
(1948) (finding search without warrant to be invalid when probable cause only existed after
entering property without warrant); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948)
(noting that search warrant “serves a high function” and without exigencies it is imperative,
even if evidence is uncovered).
238
Professor LaFave calls Blackmun’s reasoning “unmitigated poppycock, for if any point
is solidly grounded in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, it is that the police cannot
‘bootstrap’ themselves into probable cause; a search may not be justified by what turns up in
that search.” 3 LAFAVE, supra note 13, § 7.2(d), at 773.
239
Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 575 (quoting Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 770 (1979)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
240
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (quoting Agnello v. United States, 269
U.S. 20, 33 (1925)).
241
Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 579 (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982)).
Seo writes that Acevedo “explicitly overrul[ed]” Chadwick. SEO, supra note 4, at 253. That is
mistaken. Acevedo dealt with the scope of the automobile exception under Carroll and its
progeny. Chadwick, by contrast, did not address the validity of the search of the footlocker
under the automobile exception because the government never made that argument. See
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11 (1977) (“The Government does not contend that
the footlocker’s brief contact with Chadwick’s car makes this an automobile search . . . .”).
Further, the footlocker’s contact with Chadwick’s vehicle was fleeting at best, and so there
was no need to address the automobile exception in Chadwick.
242
Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 580 (quoting Ross, 456 U.S. at 824).
243
Blackmun states that Acevedo’s holding “neither extends the Carroll doctrine nor
broadens the scope of the permissible automobile search delineated in Carroll, Chambers,
and Ross.” Id. at 580.
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the warrantless search of the suitcase was proper “not because the property
searched was luggage, but rather because it was taken from an automobile
lawfully stopped and searched on the street.”244 Writing for the Court in Sanders,
Justice Powell characterized this argument as an extension of Carroll because it
“allow[s] warrantless searches of everything found within automobile, as well
as the vehicle itself.”245 Yet this is the rule embraced in Acevedo,246 and it
demonstrates that the modern Court’s view of motorists’ privacy interests is the
same—if not narrower—than it was nearly one hundred years ago.247
Obviously, Acevedo mirrors Justice Blackmun’s dissents in Chadwick and
Sanders. But he needed four additional Justices to obtain a majority to overrule
Sanders.248 What caused the other Justices to join Blackmun’s opinion? Evidently,
several of the Justices believed that pre-Acevedo law placed a premium on police

244

Sanders, 442 U.S. at 762.
Id.
246
Justice Blackmun took this position at least since his Chadwick and Sanders dissents.
Indeed, in 1982, he told his colleagues during the Conference discussion in Ross that he was
prepared to “go through Carroll and let them go whole hog.” DEL DICKSON, THE SUPREME
COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940-1985): THE PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS BEHIND NEARLY 300
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 462 (2001). In other words, whenever the police had probable
cause, they were permitted to “go whole hog” and search not only the entire vehicle but also
any container found within the vehicle. Justice Blackmun joined Justice Stevens’s opinion in
Ross not because he agreed with the logic of Ross but only so that there would be “an
authoritative ruling” from the Court. Ross, 456 U.S. at 825 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
247
If further proof is needed that Acevedo extends, rather than simply applies Carroll,
consider the following. In his Coolidge opinion, in the interest of providing clarity regarding
the scope of the automobile exception, Justice White proposed that the Court “treat searches
of automobiles as we do the arrest of a person.” Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
527 (1971) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Coolidge majority
disagreed and had this response:
[I]f we take the viewpoint of a judge called on only to decide in the abstract, after the
fact, whether the police have behaved “reasonably” under all the circumstances—in short
if we simply ignore the warrant requirement—Carroll comes to stand for something
more. The stopping of a vehicle on the open highway and a subsequent search amount
to a major interference in the lives of the occupants. Carroll held such an interference to
be reasonable without a warrant, given probable cause. It may be thought to follow a
fortiori that the seizure and search here—where there was no stopping and the vehicle
was unoccupied—were also reasonable, since the intrusion was less substantial, although
there were no exigent circumstances whatever. Using reasoning of this sort, it is but a
short step to the position that it is never necessary for the police to obtain a warrant before
searching and seizing an automobile, provided that they have probable cause. And Mr.
Justice White appears to adopt exactly this view when he proposes that the Court should
“treat searches of automobiles as we do the arrest of a person.”
Id. at 479 (opinion of the court).
248
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter joined
Blackmun’s opinion. Justice Scalia filed a separate opinion concurring in judgment. See
Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 581-85 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). Justices White, Marshall,
and Stevens dissented.
245
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ignorance and was plagued by contradictions. Justice Blackmun stated that the Ross
and Sanders rules created a contradiction such that “the more likely the police are
to discover drugs in a container, the less authority they have to search it.”249 Justice
Scalia thought it made no sense to require a warrant to search a briefcase “when it
is being carried along the street, but for that same briefcase to become unprotected
as soon as it is carried into an automobile.”250 But Scalia also agreed with Justice
Blackmun that it was anomalous to permit a warrantless search of a locked glove
compartment in a car but require a warrant to permit search of an unlocked briefcase
found in a car.251 Accordingly, Acevedo announces “one clear-cut rule to govern
automobile searches and eliminate[s] the warrant requirement for closed
containers” found in automobiles.252
These concerns are misplaced. There is nothing strange or contradictory about
pre-Acevedo law if one keeps in mind the basic adage that a warrantless intrusion
must be “strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation.”253 In
the context of a private container taken from a car, the warrantless seizure of the
container is justified because of its potential mobility. A warrantless search,
however, is not justified because the container is—as Justice Blackmun concedes—
“easy for the police to store”254 and retains sufficient expectations of privacy to
warrant a magistrate’s finding of probable cause before a search is permitted.255
Indeed, as Chief Justice Burger instructed, there is nothing unusual about requiring
police to obey the requirements of the Warrant Clause before undertaking a search
of an object, even though seizure of that same object is permissible without a
warrant.256 These are norms criminal procedure students learn in law school.
249

Id. at 577 (majority opinion).
Id. at 581 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
251
Id.
252
Id. at 579 (majority opinion). It is not so evident that Justice Blackmun’s “clear-cut”
rule will produce certainty for police and judges and eliminate the supposed confusion caused
by the dual track of Ross and Sanders. As Professor Yale Kamisar remarked shortly after
Acevedo was decided:
If the police only have probable cause to search a specified container in a vehicle, they
no longer need a warrant to open that container, but they still cannot search the entire
vehicle. Thus the police still have to ascertain which kind of probable cause they have.
For resolution of that issue determines the scope of the warrantless search they may
make.
Yale Kamisar, Professor of Law, Remarks at the U.S. Law Week’s 13th Annual Constitutional
Law Conference: Arrest, Search and Seizure (Sept. 6, 1991) (on file with author).
253
See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 26 (1968)).
254
Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 574.
255
Id.
256
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977) (finding seizure reasonable “to guard
against any risk that evidence might be lost,” even though search unreasonable without
warrant). Justice Stevens later echoed this difference between searches and seizures:
[I]f there is probable cause to believe [a container holds] contraband, the owner’s
possessory interest in the container must yield to society’s interest in making sure that
250
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The real issue at stake in Acevedo is never framed by the Court. That is: Should
the Warrant Clause apply to personal effects? The result in Acevedo is predictable
if the focus is on the automobile. Justice Blackmun decries a “curious” dichotomy
between “the search of an automobile that coincidentally turns up a container and
the search of a container that coincidentally turns up in an automobile.”257 But this
dichotomy is curious only because both containers were found in a vehicle. If the
focus is on the container itself instead of its location, the dichotomy disappears. The
answer to the question never asked in Acevedo is that because the Fourth
Amendment protects effects as well as persons and homes and because the Warrant
Clause does not distinguish “between searches conducted in private homes and
other searches,”258 warrantless searches of private containers are per se
unreasonable.
C.

Promoting Law Enforcement Interests (at the Expense of Fourth
Amendment Interests)

Justice Blackmun played an important role in the Court’s narrow vision of
motorists’ privacy. In 1974, he introduced (with scant analysis) the norm that
motorists have a lesser expectation of privacy in their vehicles in Cardwell v.
Lewis259 and then applied the same faulty reasoning to closed containers
seventeen years later in Acevedo. In between, the Court decided that a
warrantless search of a motor home found parked in an off-the-street lot near a
courthouse was reasonable where supported by probable cause. California v.
Carney260 explained that the “twofold” reasons for the automobile exception

the contraband does not vanish during the time it would take to obtain a warrant. The
item may be seized temporarily. It does not follow, however, that the container may be
opened on the spot. Once the container is in custody, there is no risk that evidence will
be destroyed. Some inconvenience to the officer is entailed by requiring him to obtain a
warrant before opening the container, but that alone does not excuse the duty to go before
a neutral magistrate.
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 749-50 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring).
257
Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 580.
258
Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 8.
259
417 U.S. 583 (1974).
260
471 U.S. 386 (1985).
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applied to a motor home.261 First, the motor home is “readily mobile.”262 Second,
“the expectation of privacy with respect to one’s [motor home] is significantly
less than that relating to one’s home or office.”263 This diminished privacy, the
Court elaborated, derives “not from the fact that the area to be searched is in
plain view, but from the pervasive regulation of vehicles capable of traveling on
the public highways.”264 Really?
In New Jersey, my home state, every car must pass an inspection to be eligible
for a state registration sticker. The inspection includes, inter alia, inserting a thin
rod into the exhaust pipe to measure engine emissions. (State inspections never
involved opening glove compartments, the trunk, or even a visible examination
of the passenger compartment of the vehicle.) So the Court wants the public to
believe that because a state official sticks a pollution control device in the
exhaust pipe of a motor home, the owner of that vehicle has a reduced
expectation of privacy interest in the cupboards, stuffed chairs, bunk beds, and

261

The vote in Carney was six-to-three. Chief Justice Burger’s opinion was joined by
Justices White, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and O’Connor. Powell’s vote to join the
majority was noteworthy in light of his authorship of Sanders. Interestingly, Powell, in a
memorandum to himself, noted that he was initially “inclined” to vote for Carney. He noted:
“I do not regard the fact that this particular home, found in a parking lot, probably was being
driven from place to place. Tens of thousands of people, often seeking employment, move
about the country in vehicles used as residences.” California v. Carney, Supreme Court Case
Files Collection, Box 83, Powell Papers, Lewis F. Powell Jr. Archives, Washington & Lee
University School of Law, Virginia (memorandum for the file, dated August 15, 1984). But
Powell changed his mind after the oral argument, in part, based on the Solicitor General’s
presentation. See id.
Equally notable is that Justice White, after joining the majority opinion in Carney dissented
in Acevedo six year later. Justice White’s dissent in Acevedo simply noted his agreement “with
most of Justice Stevens’ [dissenting] opinion and with the result he reaches.” Acevedo, 500
U.S. at 585 (White, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens filed a dissent in Carney joined by Justices
Brennan and Marshall. Professor Seo does not discuss Carney.
262
Carney, 471 U.S. at 393. The “mobility” justification does not pass the straight-face
test. Chadwick and Ross rejected mobility as a justification for excusing the warrant
requirement. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 13 (rejecting mobility of footlocker as justification for
“dispensing with the added protections of the Warrant Clause”); see also United States v.
Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 811 (1982) (restating Chadwick’s rejection of mobility for basis of
warrantless search). As Justice Stevens’s dissent noted:
It is perfectly obvious that the citizen has a much greater expectation of privacy
concerning the interior of a mobile home than a piece of luggage such as a footlocker. If
“inherent mobility” does not justify warrantless searches of containers, it cannot
rationally provide a sufficient justification for the search of a person’s dwelling place.
Carney, 471 U.S. at 405-06 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
263
Id. at 391 (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976)).
264
Id.
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refrigerator of the vehicle against a warrantless police search? 265 Nobody
believes that.266 Instead, what drove the result in Carney was the Court’s desire
to promote law enforcement. As Chief Justice Burger admitted, “the overriding
societal interests in effective law enforcement justify an immediate search before
the vehicle and its occupants become unavailable.”267 Carney is another example
in a long list of cases in which the Justices proffered the feeble claim that
“expectations of privacy are lower in automobiles than in most other places” 268
in order to make police searches easy.269
If the Court’s conclusion that motorists have reduced privacy in containers
found in vehicles lacks credibility, how should people react when police invoke
265

Id. at 393 (asserting that “there is a reduced expectation of privacy stemming from [the
motorhome’s] use as a licensed motor vehicle subject to a range of police regulation
inapplicable to a fixed dwelling”).
266
As Professor LaFave rightly notes, “[W]hy the privacy of the living area [of a motor
home] is reduced by [regulation and inspection of motor vehicles regarding licensing and
safety] is never explained” by Carney. 3 LAFAVE, supra note 13, § 7.2(b), at 738.
267
Carney, 471 U.S. at 393. The Chief Justice’s apparent concerns about the motor home
and its occupants becoming unavailable were groundless because the vehicle was parked “a
few blocks from the courthouse in downtown San Diego where dozens of magistrates were
available to entertain a warrant application,” and there was “no indication of any imminent
departure.” Id. at 404 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
268
Joseph Grano, Perplexing Questions About Three Basic Fourth Amendment Issues:
Fourth Amendment Activity, Probable Cause, and the Warrant Requirement, 69 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 425, 459 (1978).
269
There is an aspect of this phenomenon in Ross as well. The essence of Ross’s logic
boiled down to the following comments: “When a legitimate search is under way . . . nice
distinctions between . . . glove compartments, upholstered seats, trunks, and wrapped
packages, in the case of a vehicle, must give way to the interest in the prompt and efficient
completion of the task at hand.” United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 821 (1982). So too in
Houghton:
Effective law enforcement would be appreciably impaired without the ability to search
a passenger’s personal belongings when there is reason to believe contraband or
evidence of criminal wrongdoing is hidden in the car.
To require that the investigating officer have positive reason to believe that the passenger
and driver were engaged in a common enterprise, or positive reason to believe that the
driver had time and occasion to conceal the item in the passenger’s belongings,
surreptitiously or with friendly permission, is to impose requirements so seldom met that
a “passenger’s property” rule would dramatically reduce the ability to find and seize
contraband and evidence of crime.
Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 304-05 (1999).
As Professor LaFave has commented, the “best that can be said” about the Court’s refusal
to require warrants when police want to search closed containers found in vehicles is that a
warrant requirement might result in a “mechanical routine” where judges would issue
warrants with little to no “magisterial scrutiny.” 3 LAFAVE, supra note 13, § 7.2(b), at 737.
On the other hand, when requiring warrants “for a comparatively small group of police
activities highly intrusive in nature, . . . the tendency will be to give these warrant requests
close examination.” Id.
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the automobile exception to search computers, cell phones, and other electronic
devices? Eventually, the Court will be asked to extend the logic of Carroll and
its progeny to digital equipment. The lower courts have already seen such
cases.270 For example, in United States v. Burgess,271 police had probable cause
to search a motor home for narcotics. They seized a laptop computer and two
external hard drives and later conducted a warrantless forensic search that
revealed child pornography. Defending the search, the government argued:
1) the expectation of privacy of computer contents has been likened to that
of a suitcase or briefcase; 2) the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement permits, with probable cause, the search of containers found
in the automobile—even locked suitcases and briefcases; therefore
3) police may (with probable cause, but without a search warrant) search
computers and hard drives found in automobiles. 272
Of course, this argument also applies to cell phones found in vehicles. 273
The government makes a valid point. Essentially, the automobile exception
as interpreted by the modern Court means that if probable cause supports the
search, the search is constitutional. Factors that purported to be important in the

270
See, e.g., United States v. Mayo, No. 2:13-cr-00048, 2013 WL 5945802, at *9 (D. Vt.
Nov. 6, 2013) (concluding that cell phones are not analogous to containers and cannot be
searched pursuant to automobile exception); United States v. Davis, 787 F. Supp. 2d 1165,
1171 (D. Or. 2011) (stating that automobile exception did not justify warrantless search of
phone contents); United States v. James, No. 1:06-cr-00134, 2008 WL 1925032, at *4 (E.D.
Mo. Apr. 29, 2008) (concluding that it was permissible to search cell phone without warrant
during traffic stop under automobile exception), aff’d in part sub nom. United States v.
Dinwiddie, 618 F.3d 821 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Fierros-Alvarez, 547 F. Supp. 2d
1206, 1213-14 (D. Kan. 2008) (finding automobile exception applied to search of cell phone);
United States v. Galante, No. 94-cr-00633, 1995 WL 507249, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 1995)
(ruling that cell phone is considered container and can be searched without warrant if found
in automobile that officer may search); Chung v. State, 475 S.W.3d 378, 387 (Tex. Ct. App.
2014) (ruling that cell phone could not be searched pursuant to automobile exception); see
also Andrew Wrona, How Far Can the Automobile Exception Go? How Searches of
Computers and Similar Devices Push It to the Limit, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1119, 1136-37
(2010) (advocating for “[a]n exception to the automobile exception” for computers and “other
mass storage devices”).
271
576 F.3d 1078 (10th Cir. 2009).
272
Id. at 1088 (citations omitted). The Tenth Circuit in Burgess commented that “[n]othing
in Acevedo suggests either [a search of a laptop at the scene by simply turning on the computer
and examining its contents, or a later forensic search] would be impermissible without a
warrant.” Id. at 1091. However, the court chose not to decide the issue because it found that
the search of the laptop and hard drives had been authorized by a valid warrant. Id. at 109092.
273
See, e.g., State v. Boyd, 992 A.2d 1071, 1083 (Conn. 2010) (finding warrantless search
of cell phone reasonable under automobile exception); Hawkins v. State, 723 S.E.2d 924, 92526 (Ga. 2012) (finding cell phone sufficiently analogous to container for purposes of
warrantless search).

2366

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99:2317

past, such as the mobility of the vehicle, the practicality of obtaining a warrant,
and the privacy associated with the area or object searched, are now irrelevant.
All that matters is whether the search was based on probable cause.
Similarly, a straightforward application of Acevedo would permit warrantless
searches of electronic devices found within vehicles. In addition to claiming that
the Ross dichotomy “failed to protect privacy,”274 Justice Blackmun asserted that
pre-Acevedo law “confused courts and police officers and impeded effective law
enforcement.”275 According to Blackmun, judges and cops were confused
because the dual-track approach of Ross was “the antithesis of a clear and
unequivocal guideline”276 and encouraged “‘the perverse result of allowing
fortuitous circumstances to control the outcome’ of various searches.”277 If
judges and officers were unable to know when a paper bag or suitcase discovered
in a vehicle was subject to a warrantless search, introducing an electronic device
into the picture will not induce certainty for decision-makers. And if the Ross
dichotomy “impeded effective law enforcement” 278 when applied to searches of
paper bags and suitcases, efficient law enforcement will not be promoted if
police cannot search computers and cell phones, which are more likely to contain
evidence related to drug trafficking or terrorism than a brown paper bag. In sum,
whether one focuses on the automobile exception generally or the specific logic
of Acevedo, which provided “one clear-cut rule to govern automobile
searches”279—namely, that “police may search an automobile and the containers
within it where they have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is
contained”280—electronic devices are covered by the automobile exception.
Though a “mechanical application”281 of Acevedo would support a
warrantless search of a computer or cell phone, I doubt a majority of the Justices
will authorize the search of digital devices under the automobile exception. In
Riley v. California,282 the Court addressed whether police may search a cell
phone under the “search incident to arrest” exception to the warrant requirement.
Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged that a
“mechanical application” of the Court’s search incident to arrest cases would
support a warrantless search of a cell phone. However, the Chief Justice
concluded that neither of the historical interests served by the search incident to
arrest exception—protecting officer safety and preventing the destruction of
evidence—supported searching a cell phone. That is because the data on the
274

California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 576 (1991).
Id.
276
Id. at 577.
277
Id. at 578 (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 22 (1977) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting)).
278
Id. at 576.
279
Id. at 579.
280
Id. at 580.
281
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 386 (2014).
282
573 U.S. 373 (2014).
275
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phone cannot be used to harm police or assist an escape and, after police secure
the phone, the arrestee cannot destroy evidence on the phone.283
After explaining that the traditional interests behind the search incident to
arrest exception cannot justify a cell phone search, Chief Justice Roberts
acknowledged that searches incident to arrest are also permitted due to “an
arrestee’s reduced privacy interests upon being taken into police custody,” 284
and that lower courts have applied the Court’s precedents to approve “searches
of a variety of personal items carried by an arrestee,” such as wallets, purses,
and address books.285 Following that approach, the Solicitor General in Riley
argued that “a search of all data stored on a cell phone is ‘materially
indistinguishable’ from searches of these sorts of physical items.” 286 This time,
the Court was not buying it: “That is like saying a ride on horseback is materially
indistinguishable from a flight to the moon.”287 Ultimately, Riley found that
“[c]ell phones differ in both a quantitative and a qualitative sense from other
objects that might be kept on an arrestee’s person.”288 The vast amount of data
and intimate details and information that cell phones can store make them
uniquely different for privacy concerns from nondigital containers.
Riley’s logic and conclusion is relevant when deciding whether the
automobile exception authorizes a search of a computer or cell phone.289 Indeed,
283

Riley explained that “[d]igital data stored on a cell phone cannot itself be used as a
weapon to harm an arresting officer or to effectuate the arrestee’s escape. . . . Once an officer
has secured a phone and eliminated any potential physical threats, . . . data on the phone can
endanger no one.” Id. at 387. Regarding the interest in preventing the destruction of evidence,
Riley noted that “once law enforcement officers have secured a cell phone, there is no longer
any risk that the arrestee himself will be able to delete incriminating data from the phone.” Id.
at 388.
284
Id. at 391.
285
Id. at 392.
286
Id. at 393 (quoting Brief for the United States at 26, United States v. Wurie (2014) (No.
13-212), 2014 WL 828012, at *26).
287
Id.
288
Id.
289
In Wertz v. State, 41 N.E.3d 276 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), the court remarked:
The State’s proposed distinction would require us to conclude that a cellphone found
next to a driver in the passenger seat of his vehicle could be searched without a warrant,
regardless of the Supreme Court’s decision in Riley. But such an outcome is unthinkable
if the Court meant what it said in Riley. Although the State is correct that Riley dealt only
with the search-incident-to-arrest exception, Riley’s discussion of Fourth Amendment
protections afforded to electronic devices that store private information transcends the
search-incident-to-arrest exception. The analysis in Riley easily transfers to other
circumstances where an exception to the warrant requirement would otherwise exist,
including the automobile context.
Id. at 282 (citing United States v. Kim, 103 F. Supp. 3d 32, 54-57 (D.D.C. 2015) (applying
Riley to the search of a computer under the border exception to the warrant requirement);
Chung v. State, 475 S.W.3d 378, 387 (Tex. Ct. App. 2014) (relying on Riley and holding that
officer’s warrantless search of cell phone was not justified under automobile exception to
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Riley and Carpenter v. United States290—another opinion authored by Chief
Justice Roberts addressing the privacy of electronic data 291—strongly suggest
that “the seismic shifts in digital technology” 292 that allow vast sums of data and
personal information to be accessed and stored by the government have affected
how some of the Justices envision Fourth Amendment privacy interests in the
twenty-first century. Indeed, Carpenter is a game changer, and its significance
for digital privacy cannot be understated.293 Enormous amounts of personal data
that reveal nearly everything about a person can be stored on electronic chips.
warrant requirement)). The Ninth Circuit also relied upon Riley in deciding that cellphones
could not be searched under the automobile exception. See United States v. Camou, 773 F.3d
932, 942 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Given the Court’s extensive analysis of cell phones as ‘containers’
and cell phone searches in the vehicle context, we find no reason not to extend the reasoning
in Riley from the search incident to arrest exception to the vehicle exception.”).
290
138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
291
Carpenter addressed whether the government “conducts a search under the Fourth
Amendment when it accesses historical cell phone records that provide a comprehensive
chronicle of the user’s past movements.” Id. at 2211. In a five-to-four ruling, the Court held
that a person does have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the record of his physical
movements as captured through cell site location information (“CSLI”). Id. at 2217. The Court
also ruled that the government needs a warrant to access such information. Id. at 2221.
This is not the forum for a detailed analysis of Carpenter. Essentially, Carpenter creates
an exception to the third-party doctrine, which establishes that a person has no legitimate
expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily conveys to third parties, even if the
information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose. Id.
at 2216. While Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion insists that the government sought an extension
of the third-party doctrine to access CSLI, what Carpenter does is craft an exception to the
Court’s precedents due to the “new phenomenon” and “unique” nature of CSLI and then
balances the competing interests. Id. at 2216-17. “We decline to extend Smith [v. Maryland,
442 U.S. 735 (1979),] and [United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976),] to cover these novel
circumstances. Given the unique nature of cell phone location records, the fact that the
information is held by a third party does not by itself overcome the user’s claim to Fourth
Amendment protection.” Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217. Two points about this passage are
worth highlighting: First, why is CSLI data “unique”? Is it significantly different from credit
card data or web browsing data? Second, when the description of CSLI as “unique” is
combined with the language which states that “the fact that information is held by a third party
does not by itself overcome the user’s claim to Fourth Amendment protection,” id. (emphasis
added), this passage indicates that the Court is balancing competing interests rather than
following the bright-line rule of the third-party doctrine. For a comprehensive and critical
assessment of Carpenter, see generally Evan Caminker, Location Tracking and Digital Data:
Can Carpenter Build a Stable Privacy Doctrine?, 2018 SUP. CT. REV. 411 (2019).
292
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219.
293
See Orin S. Kerr, Implementing Carpenter, in THE DIGITAL FOURTH AMENDMENT
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 1), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
3301257 [https://perma.cc/XE3G-LX3Z] (describing Carpenter as “a blockbuster for the
Digital Fourth Amendment”); id. (manuscript at 6) (“Carpenter signals a major break from
the traditional understanding. For the first time, the Fourth Amendment is no longer about
places and things.”).
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The Justices know this, and it would be naïve to think that it does not influence
their thinking about the Fourth Amendment. And the Justices understand that
laptop computers and cell phones “differ in both a quantitative and a qualitative
sense from other objects that might be kept on an arrestee’s person”294 or found
in his vehicle.
Of course, under the logic of Riley and Carpenter the challenged police search
of a computer need not be particularly intrusive or disclose sensitive
information. Riley’s result and reasoning rested primarily on the Court’s concern
for potential invasions of privacy rather than the specific information disclosed
by the challenged searches. The cell phone searches in Riley and its companion
case, United States v. Wurie, did not come close to the concerns discussed in
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion. None of the searches disclosed whether Riley
or Wurie were predisposed to “certain symptoms of disease,” whether either had
“frequent visits to WebMD,”295 or “detailed information about all aspects of
[Riley’s or Wurie’s] life”296—harms listed by the Chief Justice if police were
allowed to routinely search cell phones incident to arrest. Nevertheless, the
searches were deemed unconstitutional because the Court focused on the
“possible intrusion on privacy” that a cell phone search would entail.297
Similarly, in Carpenter, the CSLI data obtained by the government merely
showed that Carpenter’s phone was located in certain neighborhoods. “[T]here
was no evidence that the records revealed anything interesting or private beyond
the phone being in the general neighborhood of several robberies around the
time they occurred.”298 In other words, the CSLI data did not identify precisely
where Carpenter or his phone were located, let alone provide “an intimate
window into [Carpenter’s] life, revealing not only his particular movements, but
through them his ‘familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual
association.’”299
As noted above, the automobile exception has evolved into a categorical rule
under the modern Court: probable cause to support a search makes the search
constitutional. Therefore, when police follow this categorical rule, searching a
computer or cell phone found in a car is reasonable. Yet the pre-Riley search
incident to arrest norm was also a “categorical rule,”300 just as pre-Carpenter
third-party-doctrine law established a categorical rule—namely, when a person
discloses information to a third party, the revealed information is no longer
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Kerr, supra note 293 (manuscript at 12).
299
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) (quoting United States v.
Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)).
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Riley, 573 U.S. 373, 386 (2014) (describing holding in United States v. Robinson, 414
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protected under the Fourth Amendment.301 What the Chief Justice wrote in
Carpenter is pertinent: “When confronting new concerns wrought by digital
technology, this Court has been careful not to uncritically extend existing
precedents.”302 And the Justices will not extend the automobile exception to
authorize the search of cell phones or computers. When the Court is confronted
with a search of an electronic device pursuant to the automobile exception, I
predict that a majority of the Justices will engage in a balancing analysis—
similar to what occurred in Riley and Carpenter—and will carve out an
exception to the automobile exception for certain electronic devices, such as cell
phones and computers. The result will not be a “neutral principle.” Nor will it
be easily reconciled with Acevedo. But life tenure does not require that the
Justices be consistent in the rulings they issue.
CONCLUSION
Once the automobile became available to many Americans, it was inevitable
that police would focus their attention on motorists. “[T]he multitude of traffic
laws that everyone disregarded at one point or another gave the police what
amounted to a general warrant to stop anyone.”303 As the twentieth century
unfolded, enforcing Prohibition and other crime control ventures, like the War
on Drugs, provided additional reasons for police to target, stop, and search
motorists.
Since 1925, the Supreme Court’s resolution of Fourth Amendment cases
involving motorists have played a significant role in defining freedom in
America. The Court’s rulings have not been welcomed by all. In 1966, a
perceptive scholar of the Court’s Fourth Amendment rulings wrote, “[C]ases
involving automobile searches . . . have generated powerful judicial
controversy.”304 Thirty years later, Professor David A. Sklansky, another
discerning scholar of the Court, advised that how the Court “handles
controversies over vehicle stops—what it says and what it does not say—has a
good deal to tell us about its broader understandings of the role of the Fourth
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Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2232 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“[T]he fact that information
was relinquished to a third party was the entire basis for concluding that defendants in [prior
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Amendment.”305 Discussing four car stop cases from the 1996 Term, Sklansky
noted:
[T]he four cases reveal a strong degree of consensus on the Court about the
proper application of the Fourth Amendment, and that the consensus results
not from a settled body of doctrine but rather from shared, largely unspoken
understandings. These understandings strongly favor law enforcement and,
more troublingly, disregard the distinctive grievances and concerns of
minority motorists stopped by the police. In ways the vehicle stop cases
help to illustrate, this disregard is deeply embedded in the structure of
current Fourth Amendment law, and over the long term it limits the
protection the Amendment provides to all of us.306
On the other hand, law enforcement officers have learned to employ many of
the Court’s rulings as a “sword” to investigate motorists. 307
Policing the Open Road expertly studies these controversies and more.
Professor Seo’s book is a highly informative study of the Court’s car cases
spanning nearly a century. Further, Seo’s insights will very likely help us
understand how the Court resolves future controversies. Although technology is
changing automobile travel, cars will be with us for the foreseeable future. And
where there are cars, there will also be cops, which means motorists will be
stopped and searched.308 For anyone interested in learning about how the Court’s
305
David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth
Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 271, 272.
306
Id. at 273.
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DAVID K. SHIPLER, THE RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE: HOW OUR SEARCH FOR SAFETY INVADES
OUR LIBERTIES 41 (2011) (describing reliance on reasonable suspicion standard rather than
probable cause standard contained in memo for special unit of Washington D.C. police
department that uses traffic stops to look for guns: “For too long police officers have been
trained to view the Constitution of the United States and its judicial interpretations as placing
rigid restrictions on what law enforcement personnel can do on the street while shielding
criminals from detection. . . . The members of the . . . Gun Recovery Unit have viewed the
Constitution and its associated case law as a law enforcement sword rather than a shield”
(alterations in original)).
308
For the October 2019 Term, the Court granted certiorari to decide whether, for purposes
of an investigative stop under the Fourth Amendment, it is reasonable for an officer to suspect
that the registered owner of a vehicle is the one driving the vehicle absent any information to
the contrary. Kansas v. Glover, 139 S. Ct. 1445, 1445 (2019) (mem.). Last Term, the Court
chose not to review an issue that it is likely to see again: whether police are permitted to stop
a vehicle in the absence of reasonable suspicion or probable cause that the driver has
committed a traffic offense or other crime on the ground that the stop is merely “information
seeking.” Nebraska v. Sievers, 911 N.W.2d 607, 619 (Neb. 2018), modified on rehearing, 920
N.W. 443 (Neb. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2746 (2019) (mem.). Professor Michael
Gentithes has written an informative article examining how witness stops exacerbate racial
profiling. See generally Michael Gentithes, Suspicionless Witness Stops: The New Racial
Profiling, 55 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3420816 [https://perma.cc/D364-YYZ9].
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rulings have shaped and mostly restricted the liberty and privacy of motorists,
Policing the Open Road is required reading.

